Iran Accelerates Reinforcement of Nuclear Facilities and Military Bases: Satellite Images Show Signs of War Preparations

Satellite imagery from February 16, 2026, reveals that a newly constructed facility named Taleghan 2 within Iran's Parchin military base, located approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran, has been completely covered with concrete and soil layers, disappearing from satellite view. This is not an isolated case. From the filling of tunnel entrances at the Isfahan nuclear facility to the reinforcement of tunnel group entrances at Mount Kho near Natanz, and the repair works at missile bases in southern Shiraz and Qom, a series of commercial satellite images indicate that Iran is undertaking large-scale, systematic defensive reinforcement projects at multiple critical sites across the country. These actions, occurring during the sensitive period when Washington has threatened military operations and nuclear negotiations in Geneva are still ongoing, demonstrate both the speed and scale of Iran's substantial preparations for potential conflict.

Critical facilities are moved underground.

Analysts from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) have been continuously monitoring satellite imagery and have identified a series of coherent engineering developments. Taking the Taleghan-2 facility at the Parchin military base as an example: In October 2024, the site was reportedly struck by an Israeli airstrike, damaging a rectangular building. Subsequent imagery shows reconstruction began: signs of rebuilding were already visible by November 6, 2024; by October 12, 2025, the framework of a new building and two auxiliary structures appeared; by November 14, the large structure was covered with a metal roof. Key changes occurred between December 13, 2025, and February 16, 2026, as the facility was gradually covered and eventually completely concealed by what ISIS refers to as a concrete sarcophagus. ISIS founder David Albright stated on social media that the prolonged negotiations provided Iran with the opportunity to bury the facility underground, creating a robust bunker capable of withstanding airstrikes.

The operations at the Isfahan Uranium Enrichment Plant are more direct. This facility was one of the three Iranian nuclear sites targeted by a U.S. airstrike in June last year, and its underground areas are considered by diplomats to be the storage location for most of Iran's enriched uranium. On January 29, 2026, ISIS reported that two tunnel entrances were being backfilled. By February 9, a third entrance had also been sealed, indicating that all access points to the tunnel complex were completely closed. Analysis suggests that backfilling the entrances not only mitigates the impact of airstrikes but also makes it difficult for special forces to penetrate from the surface, seize, or destroy any highly enriched uranium that may be stored inside. At the Hao Mountain tunnel cluster, located about 2 kilometers from the Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, imagery shows that reinforcement work has been underway at two entrances since February 10, with a large number of dump trucks, concrete mixers, and other equipment on site.

Repair of the missile base.

Apart from nuclear facilities, Iran's conventional strike forces are also recovering from last year's conflict. According to an assessment by Israel's Alma Research and Education Center, the missile base in southern Shiraz is one of Iran's 25 main bases capable of launching medium-range ballistic missiles, which suffered minor ground damage during last year's war. A comparison of images from July 3, 2025, and January 30, 2026, shows that reconstruction and cleanup are underway in the base's main logistics area and suspected command area. However, forensic image analyst William Goodhind noted that the base has not yet fully restored its pre-airstrike operational capabilities. Similarly, at the Qom missile base, located approximately 40 kilometers north of Qom City, image comparisons indicate that repairs to a new roof on a damaged building began on November 17, 2025, and were completed about ten days later.

These repairs are not simple restorations. They are conducted in parallel with the hardening of nuclear facilities, constituting a comprehensive national defense enhancement plan. Iran's intention is clear: to improve the survivability of strategic assets after a first strike, ensuring the retention of retaliatory capabilities in the event of conflict escalation. Moving critical facilities underground or thickening their cover is a cost-effective strategy to counter precision-guided weapons from the United States or Israel. The rapid repair of missile bases aims to maintain deterrence and counterattack capabilities against U.S. bases and their allies in the Middle East.

Military Preparations During Negotiations

Diplomatic channels remain open at present. On February 17, the United States and Iran held talks in Geneva, Switzerland. U.S. officials are expected to receive a proposal from Iran aimed at bridging differences within the next two weeks. However, the pace of military preparations revealed by satellite imagery contrasts with the rhythm of diplomatic negotiations, and even exhibits a certain complementarity. Strategically, accelerating military readiness while negotiating brings multiple benefits for Iran: it not only increases leverage at the negotiating table—demonstrating its ability to withstand conflict and make it costly—but also prepares practically for the worst-case scenario of negotiations breaking down.

Military pressure from the United States is also increasing simultaneously. Reports indicate that the U.S. military could be ready to attack Iran as early as this weekend, although President Trump has not yet made a final decision. This posture of applying pressure to promote negotiations, in turn, validates the rationality of Iran's accelerated efforts to reinforce its facilities. Following recent talks, Iran's foreign minister stated that both sides have reached an agreement on guiding principles, but the ambiguity of specific details precisely leaves room for military preparations. Analysts believe that Iran's leadership is likely adopting a strategy of hoping for the best while preparing for the worst. Deep reinforcement of nuclear facilities requires time, and the process of diplomatic negotiations provides this buffer period.

Impact on regional security

Once Iran's fortification is completed, it will reshape the form and cost of potential future military conflicts. First, it significantly increases the difficulty of strikes. Destroying an underground facility covered by dozens of meters of soil and concrete will require substantially greater ammunition yield, strike precision, and the number of attack waves. This may compel the attacking side to employ heavier and more sensitive weapons, thereby raising the risk of conflict escalation and the political costs involved. Second, this enhances Iran's second-strike capability. Even in the event of a surprise attack, surviving hardened nuclear facilities and missile bases can still provide means for retaliation, making any decision to launch a preemptive strike more challenging.

From the perspective of regional security dynamics, Iran's actions may stimulate a new round of military-technological competition. Israel and the United States might accelerate the development of more powerful hard-target strike weapons, such as massive bunker-buster bombs, or rely more on asymmetric means like cyber warfare and special operations to offset Iran's defensive advantages. On the other hand, the engineering capabilities and strategic patience demonstrated by Iran could also be observed and emulated by other actors in the region, further promoting the trend of underground and dispersed military facilities in the Middle East.

The underlying reason is that this silent engineering competition reflects the core of the Middle East's security dilemma: an extreme lack of trust has led both sides to view physical preparations as a more reliable safeguard than diplomatic commitments. Each truckload of earth and every cubic meter of concrete recorded in satellite imagery is a tangible manifestation of this distrust. While negotiators weigh their words in Geneva, construction vehicles in the desolate mountains of central Iran are embedding this distrust into the very ground. The robustness of these shelters may influence the trajectory of the next phase of U.S.-Iranian rivalry more profoundly than any written agreement.