In the wave of a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation, chips, as the "cornerstone" of modern technology, play a pivotal role in global technological competition. In recent years, as competition between China and the United States increasingly focuses on high-tech fields, disputes in the semiconductor industry have become increasingly intense. The competition among major powers in the era of digital intelligence is not only about the future comprehensive national strength but also a key issue closely linked to national security and international influence. As China and the United States engage in fierce competition over chips, how should we view this complex situation? And how can we turn challenges into opportunities? These are questions worth in-depth exploration.

一、中美博弈新阶段：聚焦芯片

（一）中美贸易战开打，“美国优先”下的“脱钩断链”

After Donald Trump took office, the U.S. government raised the banner of "America First" and attempted to "decouple and sever supply chains" with China, thus initiating the Sino-U.S. trade war. During this period, the Trump administration even wielded the sanctions stick against allies such as the EU, Japan, and South Korea, imposing tariffs on billions of euros worth of European steel and aluminum exports and implementing trade restrictions on Japan and South Korea. Faced with America's aggressive moves, sanctioned countries, led by China, had no choice but to passively adopt countermeasures.

Looking back at the strategic maneuvers of various parties during this phase, the United States has been aggressively reaching out in all directions but failed to achieve the zero-sum game objective of "benefiting at others' expense." Instead, due to countermeasures from other nations, the situation has evolved into a "lose-lose" scenario. On the surface, this stage revolves around the issue of trade imbalance between China and the U.S., but the underlying reasons—such as the convergence of industrial structures between the two countries and their competitive stance in high-end manufacturing—have become evident. Containing China's technological catch-up has emerged as an inevitable choice for the U.S. in the future.

(2) The Biden administration focuses on technological containment, building a "small yard, high fence"

After taking office, Biden set the core goal of preventing China from rapidly advancing into global technology-intensive industries, striving to consolidate U.S. dominance in high-tech fields without overturning the existing global economic order. Unlike Trump's relatively isolated foreign policy, the Biden administration actively worked to repair relations with allies. The U.S. and Europe collectively implemented a "de-risking" policy toward China, while the U.S. also allied with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to form the "Chip 4 Alliance" to contain China. Additionally, by threatening to expand the enforcement of the "Foreign Direct Product Rule," the U.S. pressured companies like Japan's Tokyo Electron and the Netherlands' ASML to cease cooperation with China.

Domestically, the U.S. has pushed for the enactment of the CHIPS and Science Act, while the Bureau of Industry and Security under the Department of Commerce has amended the Export Administration Regulations and issued interim final rules to restrict exports to China of advanced computing chips, supercomputers, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, among other items.

In response to the containment behind the "de-risking" strategy of Europe and the United States, China has demonstrated remarkable strategic composure. Not only has it actively engaged in external communication and sternly protested against sanctions from the U.S. and Europe, but it has also steadfastly pursued independent innovation and deepened the Belt and Road Initiative. While the technological protectionist policies of Europe and the U.S. may have some negative impact, they are not enough to shake the foundation. On one hand, it is difficult for the U.S. and Europe to completely decouple and sever supply chains with China; on the other hand, China's independent innovation capabilities in high-tech competition and its vast domestic market provide the confidence to withstand external pressures.

The "de-risking" strategy adopted by Europe and the United States has, in effect, compelled China to accelerate the optimization and adjustment of its industrial structure, serving as a catalyst to expedite domestic industrial upgrading in line with prevailing trends. Meanwhile, the continuous deepening of the Belt and Road Initiative, which counters risks with openness, can also mitigate to some extent the negative impacts brought by the containment efforts of the U.S. and Europe.

(3) The Arrival of the Trump Era: The "Small Courtyard" May No Longer Exist

During the transition between two U.S. administrations, the Biden administration, in its final days, sought to further expand its political legacy. On [specific date], the Biden administration announced new semiconductor sanctions against China, adding [number] Chinese companies to the Entity List, covering the entire semiconductor manufacturing chain, marking the largest U.S. semiconductor sanctions to date. On [specific date], the U.S. government launched an "investigation" into China's semiconductor industry, focusing on mature-node chips, with a public hearing scheduled for [specific date]. On [specific date] this year, the Biden administration imposed export controls related to artificial intelligence, further restricting the export of AI chips and model parameters, while creating obstacles for third-party trade with China.

After Trump takes office, the situation may become even more unpredictable. After all, during the election campaign, he once again demonstrated his clear stance of extreme trade protectionism and "America First." To counter the potential resurgence of the "indiscriminate, take-no-prisoners" strategy from Trump's first term, the European Union has refined its trade toolkit. In recent years, it has introduced a series of foreign trade and economic laws, including the Critical Raw Materials Act, the EU Chips Act, the Digital Markets Act, the Digital Services Act, and the Anti-Coercion Instrument.

Having weathered the relentless onslaught during Trump's first term and the joint containment efforts under the Biden administration, China has gained valuable experience in responding to external challenges, with trade control tools remaining flexibly deployable. The difference now lies in China's significant progress in recent years—expanding diversified international markets, strengthening global presence, and advancing industrial upgrades—which will further mitigate the negative impact of Western efforts to curb China's high-tech development. Moreover, whether Trump can continue to rally Europe after taking office remains highly uncertain.

2. The Multi-Party Struggle in the Chip Sector

The Three-Way Battle Surrounding NVIDIA

In the U.S.-China semiconductor rivalry, high-tech companies represented by Nvidia have gradually taken center stage. Nvidia holds a dominant % market share in the data center chip market, and its chips are also essential for computational reasoning in electric vehicle autonomous driving. In , despite export restrictions imposed by the U.S. government, Nvidia surpassed Apple to become the world's second-largest company by market capitalization, underscoring its undeniable economic value.

In fact, as early as [year], the U.S. had restricted NVIDIA from exporting high-end chips such as [specific chip names] and high-end gaming graphics cards to China. In [year], the U.S. updated its chip export regulations, prompting NVIDIA to specifically launch [number] chips, including [specific chip name], tailored for the Chinese market. Previously, NVIDIA's Jensen Huang repeatedly disagreed with U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, opposing the restriction of chip exports to China on the grounds of "national security." In [month and year], the U.S. Department of Justice launched two major investigations into NVIDIA for alleged monopolistic practices and abuse of market dominance. (Note: Replace the bracketed placeholders like [year], [specific chip names], [number], and [month and year] with the actual details from the original text for a complete translation.)

Clearly, multinational high-tech companies like NVIDIA, driven by their own interests, seek both short-term gains and long-term benefits, rather than being entirely subservient to the U.S. government. In turn, the U.S. government shows no mercy toward such "disobedient" multinational corporations.

In the semiconductor rivalry between China and the U.S., China's countermeasures primarily target U.S. sanctions rather than specific companies. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has repeatedly struck precise blows at critical points in the U.S. supply chain, while maintaining an open stance toward high-tech enterprises. Although the State Administration for Market Regulation once initiated an antitrust investigation into Nvidia in accordance with the law, China's antitrust penalties are relatively low in amount, having limited impact on Nvidia, with the investigation mainly aimed at safeguarding market fairness. However, on the day China announced the investigation, Nvidia's stock price closed down .%, wiping out $ billion in market value overnight. This clearly demonstrates that it is not China that cannot do without Nvidia, but Nvidia that cannot do without the Chinese market.

The proactive United States seems to have "exhausted its tricks."

Although the United States has experienced losses in traditional manufacturing sectors, it retains a significant number of high-tech industries in an attempt to maintain its global economic hegemony in the digital and intelligent era. From initially setting up technological barriers to employing the "Entity List" and then imposing frenzied suppression across the entire industrial chain, the U.S. has erected an "iron curtain of high walls" against China's high-tech development. However, judging by the means of containment, the U.S. has few cards left to play in its semiconductor sanctions against China, making it difficult to introduce new "creative" measures.

Comparing this new round of regulations with previous sanctions, the large-scale "targeting" of Chinese-related enterprises this time is largely due to the ineffectiveness of past measures, while restarting "investigations" and raising tariffs are merely old tactics rehashed. In reality, constrained by the deep interdependence of current U.S.-China trade relations, if the U.S. insists on implementing more extreme decoupling sanctions, it is likely to fall into the predicament of "the gains not offsetting the losses." Meanwhile, the U.S. wields far less influence among its allies than before, making it difficult to unite them in a comprehensive containment of China. Should this round of sanctions again prove ineffective, the U.S. may find itself in the awkward position of having "no cards left to play."

(3) China, adept at countering moves, "sits firmly on the fishing platform."

In the U.S.-China semiconductor rivalry, China has been "fighting while negotiating," responding to each move as it comes. Unlike the relative passivity seen in the early stages of the U.S.-China trade war, China has been able to swiftly and precisely counter the multiple rounds of U.S. chip sanctions in later phases. More importantly, China has firmly grasped the "ballast" of independent innovation and fully leveraged the "stabilizer" of its vast domestic market.

Over the past year, China's global share of mature-node semiconductors has nearly doubled, and it is projected to account for nearly half of the world's capacity by [year]. SMIC, the leader in China's chip foundry industry, has risen to become the third-largest player globally by market share. China's breakthrough in mature-node chips has also been "certified" by the United States. In [month and year], a report from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security revealed that at least two-thirds of surveyed American companies' products likely contain chips manufactured by Chinese foundries, with only [X]% explicitly stating their products are free of Chinese chips. Moreover, it is estimated that in the next [X] to [Y] years, mainland China will contribute nearly half of the world's new mature-node chip production capacity.

Moreover, the Dutch Prime Minister's visit to China after a year-long hiatus to discuss ASML's exports, along with NVIDIA's launch of "customized" chips for the Chinese market, underscores the significance of mainland China's vast market to the semiconductor industry.

(4) Other Countries and Regions in the Chip Competition

Amid the intense competition between China and the U.S. in the semiconductor industry, other countries and regions are also taking action. The EU, Japan, South Korea, India, and others have all formulated key investment plans for the semiconductor sector. Faced with the opportunities and challenges of the digital-intelligent era, nations are actively investing in this field to secure a competitive edge for future development. For latecomer countries, leveraging the momentum of leading semiconductor enterprises could be a cost-effective way to participate in the competition.

In [specific month and year], NVIDIA signed a strategic agreement with the Vietnamese government to establish an R&D center and data center, planning to invest between [X] and [Y] billion USD over the next [Z] years. This not only fills a critical gap in Vietnam's semiconductor industry but also provides essential support for its transition and upgrade towards higher-end segments of the supply chain. NVIDIA’s expansion into Vietnam is driven by both commercial considerations and the aim to navigate around the geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. However, whether Vietnam, as a "small temple," can accommodate NVIDIA, the "big Buddha," remains to be seen.

III. China's Response Strategies

In the short term, with Trump returning to the White House, the Sino-US semiconductor competition will enter a new phase, and we will face a tightening situation of trade protectionism. In the long run, technological competition in the digital intelligence era will continue to be a key battlefield in the power struggle among major nations, and only steadfast independent innovation can ensure