Competition in the Shadow of Technology

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. The Shadow of Competition
3. The Concealment/Disclosure Dynamic
4. Modeling Contemporary Great Power Crises
5. Conclusion: Intentional Disclosure
6. About the Author
7. Technology and Deterrence
8. Key Technology Areas
9. Disclosure to Substitute
10. Disclosure to Reduce Risk
11. Disclosure to Offset Disadvantages
12. Policy Implications: Institutional Reform and Capacity Building

Document Introduction

In a new era where technological competition is reshaping great power relations, the art of military deterrence has transcended traditional troop deployments and power projection, shifting towards gaining strategic advantage through the selective disclosure of disruptive military capabilities. This report focuses on a core question: When should a state disclose sensitive military technologies during an international crisis? This question has not been adequately addressed in existing research—while studies have affirmed the importance of military signaling, they have not deeply explored the strategic considerations behind a state's disclosure of new capabilities during the escalation phase of a crisis.

As a specialized study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Future Lab, the report frames interstate interactions as a complex bargaining process. Breaking through the limitations of traditional case studies, it employs formal modeling methods to replicate the logic of coercive bargaining, thereby revealing the core trade-offs in military capability disclosure. The report first outlines the evolution of deterrence theory and the current state of technological competition, clearly identifying the central role of 14 key technology areas—such as biotechnology, quantum science, and hypersonic technology—in great power rivalry. It then presents the practical diversity of military capability concealment and disclosure through historical case analysis.

The formal crisis bargaining model constructed by the report identifies three rational disclosure scenarios: First, disclosure to substitute, where showcasing new military capabilities replaces direct military pressure, forcing adversaries to reassess the balance of power. Second, disclosure to reduce risk, where technological demonstrations are used to correct the irrational perceptions of risk-acceptant adversaries engaged in brinkmanship. Third, disclosure to offset disadvantages, where disruptive technology demonstrations are leveraged to counter battlefield setbacks in peripheral conflicts. Each scenario includes clear applicable conditions and implementation logic, and is analyzed concretely in conjunction with potential crisis scenarios such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

Based on the model's insights, the report proposes three key policy implications: The United States needs to optimize its national security system design and strengthen strategic planning coordination; expand the application of artificial intelligence and machine learning in crisis response to build interconnected cross-departmental systems; and broaden the analytical methods of the intelligence community to develop new analytical techniques. The report emphasizes that in a context where technology is reshaping the military balance, decisions regarding military capability disclosure must be embedded within a robust framework of intelligence assessment and strategic planning to avoid counterproductive outcomes and maintain strategic stability in great power competition.