Is Russia assisting North Korea in restarting the Victory Oil Refinery?
Dynamic Assessment of Key Facilities in the Rason Area of North Korea Based on Annual Satellite Imagery and Analysis—Focusing on the Impact of Energy Cooperation on Sanctions Effectiveness and Peninsula Security
Detail
Published
23/12/2025
Key Chapter Title List
- Current Status of Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia in Other Fields
- Distribution of Key Facilities in the Rason Region
- Basic Information and Operational History of the Sungri Refinery
- Functions of the Sungri Oil Terminal and Crude Oil Transportation Links
- Analysis of the Possibility of Restarting the Sungri Refinery
- Observation of Activities at Refinery-Related Facilities (February 2025)
- Assessment of the Correlation Between Train Transport Activities and Restart Preparations
- Timeframe and Constraints for Refinery Restart
- Potential Impact of Russia's Comprehensive Support on the Restart Process
- Application of AI-Enabled Geospatial Intelligence in North Korea Analysis
Document Introduction
North Korea has long faced fuel shortages. As one of its two major refineries, the Sungri Refinery has been suspended since 1994 due to UN sanctions. Whether it will restart has always impacted the energy landscape and security situation on the peninsula. The core issue of this report focuses on whether Russia is assisting North Korea in restarting the Sungri Refinery, exploring through professional analysis the multiple potential impacts if such cooperation materializes.
The report first outlines the layout of key facilities in the Rason region, clarifying the geographical relationship and functional positioning of the Sungri Refinery and its supporting Sungri Oil Terminal. It details the former's 2 million tons/year capacity for processing Russian crude oil, the background of its suspension, and the latter's operational mechanism of transporting imported Russian crude oil from Nakhodka to the refinery via dedicated pipelines. Simultaneously, it provides a comparative introduction to the basic situation of North Korea's other operational refinery, the Ponghwa Refinery (which relies on imported Chinese crude oil).
Based on Pleiades satellite imagery (PleiadesNEOSX1) from January to February 2025 and AI analysis technology, the report presents the latest dynamics of the Sungri Refinery and surrounding facilities: For the first time in February 2025, train activity was observed since July 2024, including at least 5 tank cars and 1 freight car. Combined with meteorological data, it is judged that the train most likely arrived in the early morning of the observation day; snow removal operations have been prioritized in the refinery's administrative and support areas; and the dedicated terminal has continuously had cargo ships docked since October 2024.
The report points out that there is currently no direct evidence of the refinery restarting. However, the scale of train transport exceeds what is needed for mere facility maintenance, and the possibility of preparations for a restart cannot be ruled out—the tank cars might be used to transport heavy fuel oil required for heating crude oil. If crude oil supply, interrupted by sanctions, is restored with Russian support, North Korea would be able to produce various petroleum products such as lubricants, diesel, kerosene, and gasoline, alleviating energy shortages and boosting related industries, while potentially weakening the effectiveness of sanctions targeting its nuclear program.
Furthermore, the report analyzes practical constraints on the restart process: aging issues due to 30 years of facility idleness and a shortage of skilled technical personnel could mean the restart might take months or even years, but Russia's comprehensive support could significantly accelerate this process. From a security impact perspective, improved fuel supply could enhance the training levels of North Korea's mechanized units, naval vessels, and fighter jets, posing a greater threat to South Korea and US forces stationed there. This report relies on AI-enabled geospatial intelligence analysis methods, integrating machine learning technology and professional expertise to provide timely and reliable intelligence assessments for understanding North Korea's activities in the economic, diplomatic, and military fields.