The Hidden Threat of the Baltic Sea Submarine Power Cables

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. Current Status of Power Interconnection Infrastructure Construction in the Three Baltic States
3. Power Supply-Demand and Import Dependence in the Three Baltic States
4. Harmony Link Cable Project and Energy Network Synchronization Planning
5. Spectrum of Multiple Threats Faced by Submarine Power Cables
6. Deployment and Capabilities of Russian Navy Special Mission Forces
7. Olenya Guba Naval Base and Its Special Mission Vessels
8. Activities and Potential Threats of the Russian Ship Yantar
9. Scenario Analysis of Three Hypothetical Situations Regarding Cable Disruption's Impact on Baltic Energy Security
10. Assessment of Threat Impact Differences at Various Time Nodes
11. Composite Threat Risks in the Context of Hybrid Warfare
12. Future Challenges and Vulnerability Outlook for Baltic Energy Security

Document Introduction

In recent years, the vulnerability of transatlantic internet cables has sparked widespread discussion, yet the security threats to submarine power cables in the Baltic Sea have not received comparable attention. As a specialized research outcome of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence, this report focuses on this neglected strategic issue, analyzing the potential threats posed by Russian naval forces to the region's energy infrastructure and their profound impact on the energy security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

To break free from energy dependence on Russia and Belarus and integrate into the EU energy market, the three Baltic states have heavily invested in cross-border power interconnection projects over the past few decades. They have established four key power corridors, including LitPol Link, NordBalt, EstLink-1, and EstLink-2, and plan to commission the Harmony Link cable in 2025 to decouple from the Russia-dominated BRELL ring network and synchronize with the continental European grid. However, their insufficient self-sufficiency in electricity (with a combined power deficit of 13.1 terawatt-hours in 2020) has led to increasing reliance on submarine cables, introducing new security vulnerabilities.

The report systematically outlines the multiple threats faced by submarine power cables, including conventional risks such as anchoring operations, trawling, and terrorist attacks. It places particular emphasis on analyzing the special mission capabilities of the Russian Navy. The fleet of vessels from the Russian Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) deployed at the Olenya Guba naval base in the Barents Sea, including Project 22010 special mission ships like the Yantar, possesses the capability to carry deep-submergence vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles for underwater engineering tasks such as cable cutting and listening device deployment. Their activities in key global maritime areas have raised concerns among multiple Western nations.

Based on scenario analysis, the report constructs three hypothetical scenarios to assess the impact of cable disruptions on Baltic energy security under different timeframes (before/after 2025) and varying degrees of damage. The study finds that the short-term impact of a single or dual cable disruption is limited. However, after the three states decouple from the BRELL ring network, especially when facing a composite hybrid warfare strike combining physical and cyber attacks, it could trigger large-scale grid disturbances, power supply shortages, or even widespread blackouts.

Although the probability of the most severe hybrid warfare scenario is low, Russia's continued investment in underwater military capabilities still positions Baltic submarine power cables as potential targets in geopolitical competition. This report provides an authoritative risk assessment framework for NATO member states, policymakers in the three Baltic states, and energy security researchers, offering important references for formulating targeted infrastructure protection and energy security assurance policies.