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USAID Gaza Response Assessment: Maritime Corridor Humanitarian Aid Distribution Blocked

Focus - In-depth Analysis of the Impact of External Factors on the Execution and Supervision of U.S. Military Temporary Maritime Corridor Assistance Against the Backdrop of the Year-Long Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Detail

Published

23/12/2025

Key Chapter Title List

  1. Abstract
  2. Introduction
  3. Background
  4. External Factors Hindering USAID's Distribution of Humanitarian Aid to Gaza via JLOTS
  5. Department of Defense and Israel Defense Forces Requirements Prioritized Over Humanitarian Response Needs in JLOTS Planning
  6. Weather, Security, and Access Constraints Weakened USAID's Ability to Distribute Aid via JLOTS
  7. USAID Relied on Existing Control Measures to Oversee Humanitarian Aid Distribution in Gaza
  8. Conclusion
  9. Appendix A: Scope and Methodology
  10. Appendix B: Main Contributors to This Report

Document Introduction

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, invaded southwestern Israel, resulting in over 1,200 deaths and 253 hostages taken. Israel subsequently declared war on Hamas and imposed a comprehensive blockade on Gaza, leaving over 2 million residents facing a crisis of severed supplies such as food and medicine. Within 10 months of the war's outbreak, nearly 40,000 Gazans had died, with approximately 96% of the population experiencing severe food insecurity and a high risk of famine.

To alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) partnered with the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) starting in October 2023 to provide aid to Gaza via land crossings from Israel and Egypt. In March 2024, President Biden ordered the Department of Defense to establish a temporary maritime corridor as a supplement to land-based aid, known as the Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) system. This system transports aid to Gaza via ships, floating platforms, and a temporary beach pier from Cyprus. Planned to operate for 90 days, aiming to assist 500,000 people per month at a cost of approximately $230 million, the project was completed on May 16, 2024.

This report presents an assessment conducted by the USAID Office of Inspector General. Its primary objective is to review USAID's planning, execution, and oversight of humanitarian aid distribution through the JLOTS maritime corridor. The assessment was conducted in June-July 2024 in accordance with relevant quality standards, through analysis of USAID planning documents, risk assessment reports, project updates, and interviews with officials from the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance and the World Food Programme.

The assessment found that external factors were the primary reasons why JLOTS aid effectiveness fell short of expectations. During the planning phase, operational and security requirements from the U.S. Department of Defense and the Israel Defense Forces were prioritized over humanitarian response needs, requiring USAID and WFP to adjust their plans to accommodate these requirements. During operations, severe weather in the Mediterranean caused structural damage to the pier, leading to only intermittent operation for 20 days before it was shut down on July 17, 2024. Security risks within Gaza (including looting of aid trucks and attacks on warehouses), community misconceptions about aid neutrality, and restrictions on overland transport routes further hindered aid distribution. Ultimately, JLOTS delivered only enough aid to feed 450,000 people for one month, far short of the goal of assisting 1.5 million people cumulatively over three months.

Although JLOTS represented a new method for USAID to deliver aid to Gaza, it still relied on existing risk assessment and monitoring mechanisms for oversight. Due to the unstable environment in Gaza, USAID was unable to conduct direct on-the-ground monitoring and primarily relied on receiving project updates, incident reports from WFP, and holding regular meetings for oversight. These practices align with internal guidance for aid monitoring in non-permissive environments. While the report does not make specific recommendations, it emphasizes that USAID should draw lessons from the JLOTS experience regarding coordination, stakeholder collaboration, and contingency planning in conflict environments.