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Restoring American Seapower: A New Fleet Architecture for the U.S. Navy

(Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) The annual revised research report, based on the context of the return of great power competition, proposes a fleet restructuring plan for the U.S. Navy in the 2020s to address the challenges posed by China and Russia, through wargaming and regional situation analysis.

Detail

Published

22/12/2025

Key Chapter Title List

  1. Executive Summary
  2. Introduction
  3. Emerging Great Power Competition
  4. Operational Concepts and Methods for the Future Fleet
  5. Organization of the Deployed Fleet – Deterrence Forces and Maneuver Forces
  6. Naval Posture
  7. New Ships, Unmanned Vehicles, Weapons, Sensors, and Mission Systems
  8. Impact on Naval Aviation
  9. Readiness and Training Cycle
  10. Proposed Fleet Composition and Implementation
  11. Conclusions and Recommendations

Document Overview

This report was released in a revised version by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in 2017, aiming to address the fundamental shift in the U.S. national security environment since the end of the Cold War. The report begins by stating that the United States is entering a new era dominated by great power competition. The continuous enhancement of military capabilities by China and Russia, along with their willingness to challenge the international order, is replacing transnational terrorism as the primary concern for U.S. military planners. This transformation requires the U.S. Navy to fundamentally adjust its fleet architecture, operational concepts, deployment posture, and readiness processes.

The core argument of the report is that the U.S. Navy needs to shift from a presence-focused fleet emphasizing efficiency over the past three decades to a deterrence-focused fleet emphasizing effectiveness. In response to the ability of potential adversaries like China and Russia to use reconnaissance-strike complexes and gray zone tactics to seek rapid faits accomplis, the traditional model of deterrence through post-facto punishment has proven inadequate. The report advocates for a return to the Cold War-era concept of conventional deterrence through denial and punishment. This relies on forward-deployed naval forces capable of rapidly thwarting an aggressor's objectives in the early stages of a conflict or compelling them to cease aggression by attacking their high-value targets.

To achieve this strategic shift, the report proposes a new fleet architecture. This architecture divides the forward-deployed fleet into two main components: regionally tailored Deterrence Forces and widely deployed Maneuver Forces across the Indo-Pacific region. Deterrence Forces consist of surface action groups, submarines, and amphibious ships, focusing on providing rapid, high-volume initial strike capabilities in specific geographic areas (such as the East China Sea, South China Sea, Baltic Sea, etc.) to deter or delay adversary aggression. Maneuver Forces are centered around two Carrier Strike Groups, possessing the capability to sustain medium-intensity combat operations over longer periods. They are intended to follow Deterrence Forces for sustained combat and provide strategic flexibility across the theater.

At the operational concept level, the report elaborates on seven key areas requiring new concept development to adapt to high-intensity contested environments: Air and Missile Defense, Electromagnetic Spectrum Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Undersea Warfare, Surface and Strike Warfare, Mine Warfare, and Amphibious Operations. A common characteristic of these concepts is the extensive integration of unmanned systems to extend sensor and weapon ranges, while emphasizing distributed operations and commander autonomy in communications-degraded environments.

The report ultimately translates the aforementioned strategic, conceptual, and posture requirements into a specific fleet composition proposal. The proposed fleet includes 340 manned combatant ships under current counting rules (totaling 382 manned vessels), along with 40 Extra Large Unmanned Surface Vessels (XLUSVs), 40 Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs), and a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles and patrol aircraft. The report estimates that the shipbuilding and operational costs for implementing this architecture would be approximately 10-20% higher than the plan outlined in the Navy's FY2017 budget draft. However, it argues this is a necessary investment to maintain U.S. competitive advantage.

The analysis in this study is based on results from a series of integrated workshops, wargames, and exercises. It employs a modified requirements generation method, starting from the future strategic environment and operational concepts to inversely derive the required fleet capabilities, posture, and size. This approach aims to break the circular logic of the current force structure assessment process, providing an innovative and executable path for the Navy to maintain maritime superiority in the era of great power competition in the 2030s.