Current Status and Impact of Russia's Control over EU Nuclear Power: Annual Update Report

Key Chapter Title List

1. Overview of Fuel Suppliers in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia, and Ukraine (As of April 2025)
2. European Utility Companies and Rosatom
3. Rosatom Reactor Exports and Subsequent Fuel and Services
4. The Lingen VVER Fuel Plant – An Independent Source for VVER Fuel or a Kremlin Outpost in Europe?
5. Company Ownership Structure
6. Licensed Fuel Manufacturing
7. Development of Framatome's Proprietary Fuel Design
8. Framatome's Fuel Design Development Utilizing Euratom Funding
9. Market Prospects for Framatome Fuel
10. Safety Concerns

Document Introduction

This report is the 2025 update to the research series "Russian Control over EU Nuclear Power," authored by Patricia Lorenz, an expert with long-term engagement in anti-nuclear movements and nuclear policy research. The report focuses on the current situation where Russia continues to exert influence on the nuclear energy sectors of some EU member states through nuclear fuel supply and reactor construction. The core of the research lies in analyzing the efforts, progress, and underlying obstacles faced by countries within the EU that use Russian VVER-type reactors in diversifying their nuclear fuel supply amidst the Russia-Ukraine conflict and EU sanctions against Russia.

The report has a clear structure, beginning with a country-by-country review of the current status of nuclear fuel supply contracts in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The study finds that different countries have adopted varied diversification strategies: Bulgaria's Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant has begun using Westinghouse VVER-1000 fuel; Czech company ČEZ is collaborating with European VVER operators to develop a fully European-sovereign nuclear fuel product; although Finland's Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant is testing Westinghouse VVER-440 fuel, its supply contract with TVEL will continue until 2030; Slovakia, despite signing memoranda of understanding with Framatome and Westinghouse, recently extended its contract with TVEL until 2030; Hungary, while persisting in advancing the Paks II project with Rosatom, has signed a fuel supply agreement with Framatome; Ukraine, except for the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, has fully switched to using Westinghouse fuel. These cases demonstrate that the process of decoupling from Russian fuel supply is complex and uneven, intertwined with economic considerations, technical feasibility, and political will.

The second part of the report provides an in-depth analysis of the Framatome nuclear fuel plant project in Lingen, Germany, which is seen as key to Europe's ability to establish a VVER fuel supply chain independent of Russia. The plant plans to produce VVER fuel through European Hexagon Fuel GmbH, a joint venture between Framatome and Rosatom, with Framatome holding a 75% stake and Rosatom holding 25%. The report questions whether this move truly achieves supply chain independence in essence, or instead allows Russia to maintain long-term influence in the core area of European nuclear energy through technology licensing and the supply of critical components (such as fuel rod cladding). The report details the legal disputes, public participation, and expert hearings during the plant's licensing application process, revealing serious safety concerns held by German federal and local environmental authorities regarding this project.

The analysis in this report is based on publicly available expert opinions, media reports, official documents, and consultations with experts and officials in the field. The report does not presuppose fixed conclusions but, by presenting facts and diverse viewpoints, guides readers to contemplate a fundamental question: Against the backdrop of highly tense geopolitical situations in Europe, does maintaining deep technical cooperation with Rosatom, which is directly controlled by the Kremlin, contradict the EU's pursuit of energy sovereignty and security goals? Expert opinions cited in the report (such as Professor Roller's legal assessment for the German Federal Ministry for the Environment) clearly point out that such cooperation may pose multiple security risks, including misuse of nuclear materials, infrastructure sabotage, information leakage, and exertion of influence by foreign governments. Ultimately, the report reveals the triple challenges—technical, economic, and geopolitical—faced by the EU on the path to decoupling its nuclear energy sector from Russian dependence. This process is far from over, and its prospects remain significantly uncertain.