Europe and the Second Cold War in Submarine Cable Networks

Key Chapter Title List

1. The Second Cold War Beneath the Seabed
2. Europe's Challenge in the Cable Competition
3. Cooperation of European Companies and the Dilemma of Strategic Autonomy
4. Multiple Roots of Europe's Vulnerability
5. Sabotage Operations in the Baltic Sea
6. The Xin Xin Arctic Bear Incident
7. The Yi Peng 3 Incident and the Shift in EU Response
8. The Eagle S Incident: Europe's Firm Response
9. Subsequent Measures by NATO and the EU
10. Conclusion: The EU in Communication Infrastructure

Document Introduction

As the competition between China and the United States over global infrastructure networks intensifies, submarine cables—the invisible critical infrastructure carrying 97% of global data traffic—have become a new frontier in geopolitical rivalry. This report focuses on a series of suspected deliberate sabotage incidents targeting submarine cables and energy pipelines in the Baltic Sea between 2023 and 2025. It provides an in-depth analysis of how these incidents have exposed Europe's strategic vulnerability in the field of digital infrastructure. It also reveals how, against the backdrop of the so-called Second Cold War, Europe is evolving from a traditional geopolitical battlefield into a focal point of digital infrastructure competition and a target of hybrid threats.

The report first traces the two waves of development in the global submarine cable network and the economic and technological drivers behind them. It then outlines the competitive landscape where China and the United States are reshaping the global cable supply chain and network layout through means such as state subsidies, sanctions, and market access restrictions. Against this backdrop, the report analyzes the unique dilemma Europe faces: on one hand, as a global cable hub (e.g., Marseille, Sicily, the Canary Islands), Europe is deeply embedded in the transatlantic digital network dominated by American tech giants; on the other hand, driven by complex considerations of economic interests and strategic autonomy, European countries have not fully aligned with the U.S. position and continue to selectively support projects involving Chinese companies. Europe's reliance on a limited number of cable manufacturers (only four major suppliers), concerns about potential surveillance risks, and its geographical characteristics featuring numerous islands and interlaced sea areas collectively form the basis of its vulnerability.

The core section of the report is a detailed case study of three landmark incidents between October 2023 and December 2024: the damage to Estonia-Sweden and Finland cables and a natural gas pipeline involving the Chinese container ship Xin Xin Arctic Bear; the cutting of the Finland-Germany and Sweden-Lithuania cables by the Chinese vessel Yi Peng 3 and the subsequent EU diplomatic and law enforcement responses; and the damage to the Finland-Estonia power and fiber optic cables by the oil tanker Eagle S, flying the Cook Islands flag and suspected to belong to Russia's shadow fleet. The report details the course of events, national investigation processes, diplomatic engagements (including communications with the Chinese government), and particularly emphasizes that the Eagle S incident marked a turning point in Europe's response strategy—the Finnish Coast Guard's first interception and boarding inspection in international waters demonstrated a more assertive posture.

Based on these events, the report further discusses policy adjustments at the European and NATO levels. These include calls from Finland, Sweden, and others to invoke NATO's Article 4 for collective consultation, NATO's announcement of enhanced air and maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, and the European Commission's adoption of the "Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructure" along with increased investment in cable projects under the Connecting Europe Facility Digital strand. These measures aim to enhance network resilience by building redundant routes (including new paths connecting to Asia via the Arctic) and strengthening stress testing. The report concludes by noting that although the EU is aware of the threats and has begun to act, the uncertainty in transatlantic relations, internal competition among member states over cable market interests, and the fact that security policy remains primarily a national competence severely hinder the EU's ability to form a unified and coherent submarine infrastructure strategy. This strategic deficit not only limits its capacity to influence future network development but also leaves it persistently exposed to hybrid threats in its surrounding waters, reflecting the violent edge of the Second Cold War on Europe's frontier.