The tactical evolution of Russia in the third year of the war in Ukraine.

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. Operational Background
3. Tactical Context and Russia's Offensive Triangle
4. Evolution of Ground Close Combat Tactics
5. Firepower: Attrition in Depth
6. Engineering and Fortification
7. Reconnaissance: Mass Observation
8. Medical Support and Casualty Evacuation
9. Logistics, Resupply, and Rotation
10. Long-Range Strikes, Air Defense, and Electronic Protection
11. Recommendations for Supporting Ukraine
12. Recommendations for NATO

Document Overview

This report was authored by researchers from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) based on field visits conducted at the Ukrainian frontlines in November 2024 and January 2025. It aims to analyze key tactical-level developments for both sides of the conflict as Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its third year (as of early 2025). The report notes that the war has evolved into a highly attritional conflict, with the focus for both sides shifting from seeking breakthroughs to inflicting maximum damage on the adversary. The Russian military has created a multi-faceted dilemma for Ukrainian defenses through an offensive triangle integrating infantry/mechanized forces, mass FPV drone/artillery fire, and glide bombs (UMPK). The core of the report lies in describing the current operational systems of the Russian and Ukrainian armies and distinguishing which tactical changes are expedient measures for the current situation and which may represent enduring, significant transformations.

The main body of the report employs a functional analysis approach, systematically examining several core tactical areas. In ground close combat, Russian forces employ a probe-attrit-assault model at the squad/platoon level, relying on manpower attrition and firepower superiority, while Ukrainian forces emphasize firepower in depth, troop dispersal, and fortification protection in response. Regarding firepower, although tactical drones like FPVs cause 60-70% of Russian equipment losses, Ukrainian commanders emphasize that drones must be integrated with artillery to achieve maximum effectiveness; currently, Ukrainian artillery is severely constrained by insufficient numbers of guns, shortages of spare parts, and performance variations due to diverse ammunition (especially propellant) supply sources. Engineering and fortification work is heavily reliant on manual labor due to frontline fire threats, becoming a critical factor affecting troop survival and morale. Reconnaissance is now almost entirely drone-dominated, creating a highly transparent battlefield environment along and beyond the contact line. Medical evacuation and logistical resupply have become extremely hazardous and complex due to battlefield transparency and precision fire threats, prompting both sides to widely adopt drones for material delivery and significantly reduce personnel movement and rotation frequency.

Based on the above observations, the report proposes a series of targeted recommendations for Ukraine and its international partners. The focus of support for Ukraine should be on maintaining the sustainability of its defense, with the core issue being addressing low morale among frontline veterans. This involves increasing pay, reforming the compensation system, halting the formation of new units and prioritizing filling experienced existing units to full strength, and implementing frontline unit rotation for rest. In terms of equipment, there is a need to continuously expand the production and supply of critical items such as 155mm artillery shells and gun barrels, simultaneously scale up drone production capacity, and prioritize providing more Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) to enhance battlefield survivability and mobility. To counter the threat posed by Russian glide bombs, the report recommends reducing their sortie rates by enhancing long-range strike capabilities to target Russian airbases and supply points, and exploring technical interception solutions.

Finally, the report extracts key lessons for NATO militaries. Despite the overall poor performance of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), the asymmetric impact of their glide bombs validates the importance of air power and stand-off strike weapons. Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) capability has become an essential requirement for the survival of all services and branches, necessitating the development of economically sustainable interception means. NATO needs to re-evaluate the balance between the quantity and maintainability of mechanized platforms, prioritize artillery and specialized ammunition (e.g., BONUS) stockpiles and industrial sustainability, and thoroughly update medical evacuation doctrines that are unexecutable under modern high-intensity combat conditions. The report emphasizes that NATO forces must adapt to continuously evolving threats, rather than merely perfecting the tactics of a bygone era.