Politics and Sanctions: A Comparative Case Study of Russia and Iran
Based on a comparative analysis of legislation, strategies, and implementation agencies, explore the similarities and differences in the artificial intelligence policies of the two countries under the backdrop of Western sanctions and the response pathways (-)
Detail
Published
22/12/2025
Key Chapter Title List
- Introduction
- Basis for Case Selection
- Theoretical Framework: Technological Nationalism and Sanction Effects
- Russia's Artificial Intelligence Development Experience
- Iran's Artificial Intelligence Development Experience
- A Comparative Perspective on AI Development in Russia and Iran
- Discussion and Conclusion
- References
Document Introduction
This research report, authored by scholars from Saint Petersburg State University, aims to systematically compare the similarities and differences between Russia and Iran in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) policy, with a focus on analyzing the impact of Western sanctions on the AI development strategies of both countries. The study selects Russia and Iran as cases because both nations have long faced pressure from Western sanctions, yet exhibit significant differences in political systems, economic scale, and technological foundations. Russia has become the world's most sanctioned country since 2022, while Iran has been at the forefront of sanctions for the past four decades. This provides a unique comparative perspective for examining the long-term and short-term effects of sanctions on technological development.
The report employs a comparative analysis method, evaluating based on four core sets of parameters: AI development goals, project implementation agencies, development priorities, and positions in global AI rankings. Data sources include Oxford Insights' "Government AI Readiness Index 2021," Nature Index's "Artificial Intelligence 2020" report, Tortoise Media's "Global AI Index 2021," as well as official legislative documents, strategic plans, and media reports from both countries. The study finds that neither Russia nor Iran has established a dedicated AI ministry, but both advance AI projects through multi-agency collaboration and public-private partnership mechanisms. In Russia, policy coordination is primarily undertaken by the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Digital Development, and standardization bodies, while in Iran, it is dispersed among multiple departments such as the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Health.
In terms of responding to sanctions, the two countries exhibit different adaptive strategies. Russia emphasizes technological sovereignty, attempting to reduce external dependence through domestic platform construction, regulatory refinement, and cooperation with friendly nations. Iran relies on its resistance economy model, utilizing cryptocurrencies to circumvent financial blockades and making progress in regional markets through the development of localized applications (such as the navigation app BALAD and speech recognition technology). However, both countries still lag significantly behind global leaders like China and the United States in overall AI development levels and face ongoing constraints in areas such as high-end chips, foreign investment, and international scientific research cooperation.
The report concludes that although sanctions pose significant challenges to the AI ecosystems of both countries, they also drive them to strengthen domestic technological capabilities and regional cooperation. Military-technical cooperation between Russia and Iran in areas such as drones serves as a practical case of both sides coping with technological blockades. This study provides empirical evidence for understanding the adjustment paths of national technology policies under sanction environments and holds reference value for policymakers and scholars concerned with digital sovereignty, technological nationalism, and geopolitical technology competition.