Tripartite Realist War: Analyzing the Russia-Ukraine War

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. Major International Relations Theories
3. NATO During the Cold War and After the Dissolution of the Soviet Union
4. Ukraine's Aspiration for Political Autonomy and Its Bid to Join NATO
5. Russia's Response, Invasion, Sanctions, and International Law
6. Conclusion

Document Introduction

This report aims to provide a systematic analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 through the lens of international relations theory. The core argument is that employing realist theory (particularly its classical, offensive, and defensive neorealist branches) serves as the most effective theoretical tool for understanding this conflict. The report contends that the primary catalyst for the conflict stems from the realist interest-based calculations and interactions among the three parties—NATO, Russia, and Ukraine—which made diplomatic and collective security measures difficult to implement.

The report first establishes a theoretical framework, detailing the three major schools of international relations theory: realism (including its classical form and the structural realism developed by scholars such as Waltz and Mearsheimer), liberalism (emphasizing democratic peace theory, institutional theory, and the Responsibility to Protect), and constructivism (focusing on norms, identity, and discourse). The author explicitly argues that while liberalism and constructivism offer valuable supplementary perspectives, realism's logic of power politics, state survival, and self-help provides the most powerful analytical lens for explaining the fundamental dynamics of this war.

The report then proceeds with historical and empirical analysis. The third chapter traces the evolution of NATO since the Cold War, focusing on its policy of containing Russia through eastward expansion from its initial role of countering the Soviet Union to the post-Cold War era. The report points out that NATO's expansion, particularly the 2008 Bucharest Summit's promise of potential future membership for Ukraine and Georgia, was perceived by Moscow as a direct threat to its core security interests, constituting the security dilemma emphasized by structural realism.

The fourth chapter focuses on the evolution of Ukraine's domestic politics and foreign policy orientation. From the Orange Revolution to constitutional amendments explicitly enshrining the goals of joining NATO and the EU, Ukraine's efforts to seek political autonomy and Western security guarantees created an irreconcilable contradiction with Russia's strategic desire to maintain influence in its near abroad. The report also analyzes the United States' motivations in this war, arguing that they involve a mix of strategic considerations: containing Russia's rise, upholding the credibility of the liberal international order, and deterring other potential revisionist states (such as China). Furthermore, the report reviews Russia's criticism of the legitimacy of Western interventions in Serbia (1999), Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011), noting that these events deepened Moscow's distrust of Western-dominated international norms (such as the Responsibility to Protect) and reinforced its commitment to defending the traditional Westphalian concept of sovereignty.

In the conclusion, the report reiterates the explanatory power of the tripartite realist perspective, emphasizing that the unipolar imbalance caused by NATO expansion, Ukraine's desire for a security shelter, and Russia's offensive actions taken in response to perceived existential threats collectively form the deep structural reasons why this war is difficult to resolve quickly through diplomacy or international law. The report argues that understanding the essence of power politics in this conflict is crucial for seeking a sustainable diplomatic solution between Russia and Ukraine in the future.