Independent Progress: Advancing the Australia-Japan Defense Agenda

Key Chapter Title List

1. Executive Summary
2. Policy Recommendations
3. Introduction
4. Chapter 1: The Logic of Expanding Defense Cooperation
5. Chapter 2: Matching Words with Deeds: The Stepwise Change in Australia-Japan Defense Cooperation
6. Chapter 3: Implementation Progress
7. Chapter 4: Challenges Facing the Bilateral Agenda
8. Conclusion and Recommendations

Document Introduction

This strategic report, published by the University of Western Australia's Institute for Defence and Security Studies, aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the transformation and deepening of defense cooperation between Australia and Japan in recent years. Based on a systematic review of official policy documents, high-level statements, signed agreements, and actual military cooperation activities from both countries, the report explores the logical foundation, progress, inherent challenges, and future pathways for Australia and Japan viewing each other as their most important defense partners after the United States, against the backdrop of a rapidly changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

The report begins by noting that although Australia-Japan relations have continued to develop since the establishment of the Special Strategic Partnership in 2014, their shared assessment of the deteriorating regional strategic order in recent years, along with a consensus on elevating deterrence as the primary task of their respective defense forces, has injected new purpose and urgency into defense cooperation. The core driver of this strategic convergence is the mutual recognition that, in the face of changes in the regional balance of power, both must address short-, medium-, and long-term challenges by strengthening their own capabilities, elevating the level of defense cooperation, and supporting a durable and credible U.S. military presence. The signing of the 2022 Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the release of the new Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) are seen as completing the legal and strategic framework for practical bilateral defense cooperation, marking a new phase in the relationship shifting from foundation-laying to concrete action.

The main body of the report systematically analyzes the multi-dimensional manifestations of deepening cooperation. At the operational level, the two countries have significantly enhanced the complexity of joint operations through bilateral platforms such as the Nichi Gou Trident naval exercise and the Bushido Guardian air force exercise, as well as through joint participation in multilateral and trilateral exercises like Talisman Sabre, Yama Sakura, and Keen Edge, achieving substantive progress particularly in areas such as anti-submarine warfare, aerial refueling, and the exchange of fifth-generation fighter aircraft. In the realm of defense industry and technology, both sides have identified key cooperation areas including long-range guided weapons, integrated air and missile defense, undersea warfare, and cross-domain autonomous systems, and have signed new arrangements for research, development, testing, and evaluation. Notably, the report emphasizes that trilateral cooperation with the United States (the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, TSD) has become a core mechanism for advancing the bilateral defense agenda, with the integration process of trilateral military activities progressing faster in some aspects than bilateral cooperation.

However, the report also soberly points out a series of structural challenges facing the Australia-Japan defense agenda. The primary challenge lies in how to coordinate with their respective alliance modernization agendas with the United States, avoid integration gaps, and address potential defense trade control barriers arising from mechanisms like AUKUS. Secondly, the bilateral relationship must avoid becoming merely an appendage to trilateral cooperation; it must develop a bilateral agenda with independent practical value, especially in gray zone or low-intensity conflict scenarios that may not require direct U.S. involvement. Furthermore, both countries need to set realistic expectations, fully considering the impact of Japan's domestic political and economic changes on the pace of reform, as well as the potential constraints on bilateral interaction posed by their long-standing mindset of prioritizing cooperation with the United States.

Based on the above analysis, the report concludes with specific policy recommendations aimed at providing actionable pathways for policymakers. These recommendations include: exploring joint maritime surveillance operations in key Southeast Asian waterways; establishing a bilateral rotational deployment mechanism for Japanese amphibious forces in northern Australia, modeled on the U.S. Marine Corps rotation in Darwin; accelerating negotiations to facilitate greater Japanese use of Australian missile testing ranges; and exploring the possibility of Japanese companies participating in Australian guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprises, including co-production, maintenance, and sustainment of Japan-sourced missiles. The report ultimately concludes that, despite coexisting challenges, the Australia-Japan defense partnership, with its solid strategic consensus and institutional framework, is facing unprecedented opportunities and holds the potential to provide stronger operational capabilities for achieving shared strategic objectives.