Readjusting U.S. Strategy Toward North Korea

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction: Current Situation and Future Directions
2. The Foundation Has Collapsed
3. A Room Filled with Gasoline Vapor and Too Many Matches
4. U.S. Interests in the New Environment
5. Policies for the Future
6. Policy Recommendations
7. Organizing for Success
8. Laying the Groundwork
9. Building Positive Momentum
10. Alternatives to Maximum Pressure
11. About the Author
12. Acknowledgments

Document Introduction

This report, authored by Joel S. Wit, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and co-founder of 38 North, in May 2025, aims to conduct a systematic reassessment of U.S. policy toward North Korea in the context of a potential second Trump term. The report argues that the four major strategic assumptions underpinning U.S. policy toward North Korea over the past 35 years—namely, North Korea's international isolation, the containability of its nuclear and missile programs through sanctions, the significant geopolitical value of U.S.-North Korea normalization, and the existence of a tipping point to force denuclearization—have all failed in the current geopolitical reality. By providing comprehensive support to Russia's war in Ukraine, North Korea has ended its political, technological, and economic isolation and secured economic backing from China, granting it unprecedented room for maneuver under the protective umbrella of these two major powers.

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the extreme danger of the current East Asian security environment. North Korea has evolved into a nuclear-armed state with reliable weapon systems, doctrine, and a considerable number of nuclear warheads. Concurrently, the actions of the United States and its allies to strengthen deterrence and North Korea's countermeasures have created a vicious cycle. Compounded by Russia's predicament in Ukraine, which has driven it to form a "coalition of the sanctioned" with North Korea and Iran and abandon its long-held non-proliferation stance, the Northeast Asia region has become akin to a flammable environment filled with gasoline vapor where everyone holds a match. In this context, the risk of miscalculation, misjudgment, or accidental incidents triggering conflict, even nuclear war, has significantly increased.

Based on this, the report proposes three major strategic objectives for the United States in the new environment: the primary goal is to deter the outbreak of a second Korean War; the second is to prioritize reducing the risk of nuclear war in the region over achieving denuclearization in the short term; and the third is to construct a peace architecture on the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means. To achieve these goals, the report advocates for revitalizing summit-driven diplomacy but emphasizes the need to overcome four major challenges: changing the U.S. decision-making culture that focuses only on hotspots while neglecting the nuclear risks on the Peninsula; improving relations with China and Russia to alter their stances toward North Korea; changing North Korea's strategic calculus by offering new incentives; and demonstrating stronger leadership within the alliance to coordinate the positions of South Korea and Japan.

The core section of the report presents a series of specific and pragmatic policy recommendations. Regarding organizing for success, it emphasizes the need to establish effective decision-making mechanisms, consult expert groups with frontline experience on North Korea, and maintain consistency in policy messaging. Laying the groundwork requires rebuilding great-power consultations with China and Russia, restarting direct leader-to-leader diplomacy and communication between Trump and Kim Jong Un, and establishing regular working-level U.S.-North Korea contact channels. In building positive momentum, the report suggests prioritizing the initiation of stability talks aimed at reducing nuclear war risk, advancing diplomatic cross-recognition, conditionally suspending large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, using sanctions relief as a positive leverage, achieving initial confidence-building measures such as a freeze on weapons-grade nuclear materials and missile testing, and encouraging South Korea to advance its engagement with the North.

The report concludes that the traditional maximum pressure strategy is no longer viable in the current context where China and Russia do not support new sanctions and assist North Korea in circumventing them. A feasible alternative direction for pressure should target North Korea's increasingly rampant cybercriminal activities, which involve stealing billions of dollars through cryptocurrency, by enhancing international cooperation between governments and the private sector. The conclusions of this report are based on multiple expert workshops held under the Chatham House Rule between 2023 and 2024, incorporating insights from over forty former officials, scholars, and practitioners. It provides policymakers with a comprehensive strategic roadmap based on a realistic assessment, aimed at managing risks and seeking incremental breakthroughs.