Iran Protests: Potential U.S. Responses and Issues Facing Congress

Key Chapter Title List

1. 2025-2026 Protests: Current Situation and Background
2. Differences Between Current Turmoil and Previous Incidents
3. Fewer Options for the Iranian Government
4. Iran's Weakened Regional Status
5. Potential U.S. Responses, Future Scenarios, and Implications for Congress
6. U.S.-Iran Negotiations
7. Regime Change
8. Economic Pressure

Document Introduction

Since late December 2025, nationwide protest waves have swept across Iran, triggering government crackdowns and raising new questions about the stability of this long-standing authoritarian government opposed to the United States. U.S. President Donald Trump has indicated he is considering intervention to save the protesters. Against this backdrop, this report aims to provide the U.S. Congress with an in-depth analysis of the developments, potential U.S. policy options, and related issues.

The report first outlines the current status and background of the protests. This round of protests began on December 28, 2025, directly ignited by economic grievances stemming from the Iranian rial losing approximately half its value in 2025. The protests quickly spread from Tehran's merchant class to a broad population across all 31 provinces. After initial conciliatory rhetoric, the Iranian government shifted to severe repression, carried out under an information blackout. According to data up to January 13, 2026, the crackdown has resulted in mass arrests and casualties, potentially suppressing the frequency of protest activities. The report notes significant differences between the current turmoil and past protest waves such as those in 2017-2018, 2019, and 2022-2023. The main differences lie in the reduced options available to the Iranian government and Iran's weakened regional strategic position. Severe economic dysfunction, coupled with many protesters directly calling for an end to Supreme Leader Khamenei's rule and the Islamic Republic itself, leaves the government lacking the space it once had to address grievances through limited policy adjustments. Simultaneously, Iran suffered significant military and strategic capability losses in direct conflicts with Israel in 2024 and June 2025, and its network of regional allies has been weakened. This places Iran in one of its weakest strategic positions since the establishment of the republic in 1979, potentially leading both domestic and foreign actors to view the current protests as a more concrete threat to the system.

The core section of the report systematically explores potential U.S. responses, future scenarios, and their implications for Congress. President Trump's public statements, including threats to use force to rescue protesters, may be influencing calculations among various factions within Iran. Based on this, the report analyzes several potential scenarios: First, U.S.-Iran negotiations, where Iran might seek dialogue to buy time or assess whether an agreement could help stabilize the domestic situation. Second, regime change. Although the Trump administration's National Security Strategy advocates against imposing reforms from outside, Iran's pronounced weaknesses might be cited by those advocating for action to change its government. However, there is currently no large-scale defection within the Iranian military, security forces, or political elite. Moreover, security institutions like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are deeply economically tied to the existing system. This constrains both the protesters' chances of success and the internal forces for change the U.S. could potentially cooperate with. Military intervention could also trigger Iranian retaliation against Israel and U.S. troops, leading to high humanitarian and strategic costs. Third, increasing economic pressure, such as threatening tariffs on countries trading with Iran. Although the U.S. has imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iran, its major trading partners like Germany, China, India, and Turkey maintain relatively normal economic relations with Iran.

Finally, the report identifies areas where the U.S. Congress might consider legislative and oversight actions in this series of events. These areas include: authorizing or restricting U.S. military action; overseeing potential negotiations between the executive branch and Iran and reviewing any possible agreements (including those involving Iran's nuclear program); taking actions aimed at expanding internet access within Iran; and assessing whether external intervention would strengthen or weaken the Iranian government, or lead to other unintended consequences. Members of Congress have reacted differently to the events, including expressing solidarity with protesters, calling for action to protect them, and expressing skepticism about the effectiveness of military action in supporting the protests. This report was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a non-partisan manner to provide Congress with fact-based and professionally analyzed decision-making reference material for addressing the Iran crisis and related U.S. policy.