America's Obsession with Greenland: Implications for Europe and Policy Options

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction
2. Security Interest or Real Estate Deal?
3. Dangers to Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance
4. Potential Consequences for NATO, the EU, and Germany

Document Overview

Since the 19th century, the idea of acquiring Greenland has repeatedly surfaced within U.S. government circles, stemming from the island's strategic location and abundant resources. In 2019, then U.S. President Donald Trump first proposed purchasing Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark, later asserting that owning and controlling Greenland was absolutely necessary for U.S. national security and even international security. This move prompted Danish intelligence, for the first time in history, to view the United States as a potential threat to the Kingdom's security, as Washington no longer even ruled out the use of force against an ally. This report aims to assess the true motivations behind Trump's island purchase proposition and explore its profound implications and policy options for Europe.

The report first examines the purchase proposition from historical and legal perspectives. While territorial transactions such as the 1803 Louisiana Purchase were not uncommon 200 years ago, following colonialism and the two World Wars, the right to self-determination has become a cornerstone of interstate relations and a core principle of the UN Charter. Consequently, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen dismissed Trump's proposal as absurd, and Greenland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly stated, "We are open for business, but we are not for sale." Notably, in his lengthy speech to the U.S. Congress on March 4, 2025, Trump explicitly acknowledged the Greenlandic people's right to self-determination yet again insisted that owning the island was crucial for U.S. national security.

The core analysis of the report focuses on the motivations behind Trump's proposition, primarily revolving around two narratives: security interests and a real estate transaction. On security, Trump claimed the Arctic-North Atlantic security situation was severe, with Greenland surrounded by Chinese and Russian vessels. The report acknowledges China's growing strategic interest demonstrated through icebreaker deployments and the Polar Silk Road, and that Russia is the largest Arctic actor, but points out there is no indication Beijing plans to establish a military presence in the near term, while Moscow has historically shown little interest in Greenland due to its own resource-rich Arctic region and significant development challenges. However, the report leans more towards the view that Trump's move may be driven more by personal instinct, seeing it as the biggest real estate deal of his lifetime, an ideal practice of his "Make America Great Again" slogan, and a strategic move to encircle his next potential target, Canada. A deeper geopolitical objective might be to establish a North American hemisphere controlled by the U.S. and protected by a comprehensive "impenetrable shield" defense system. Furthermore, the report suggests that full ownership of Greenland could create conditions for establishing "free cities" governed by unregulated far-right tech elites, a vision favored by its ideological backers.

The report clearly states that Trump's island purchase initiative is highly explosive in the current geopolitical context, posing a real danger to Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance. If the United States, as NATO's leading and strongest member, were to use military force to forcibly annex an ally's territory, it would directly contradict the UN Charter principles upon which NATO is based and the commitment among allies to resolve disputes peacefully and renounce the use of force, thereby shaking the alliance's foundation. The report warns that the current Transatlantic Alliance crisis, created by Washington itself, might play right into the hands of Moscow and Beijing, as NATO's division or even dissolution would aid Russia's neo-imperialist ambitions and China's continued rise.

Against this backdrop, the report elaborates on the potential consequences for NATO, the EU, and Germany. Germany faces dual pressures in its foreign and security policy: on one hand, it still requires U.S. political and military assistance in negotiating with Moscow to end the Russia-Ukraine war, and the Bundeswehr cannot fill the significant capability gaps in strategic sensors and effectors in the short term; on the other hand, it must confront the paradoxical situation where the alliance's leading nation itself becomes a threat. The report emphasizes that Europe must consider both best-case and worst-case scenarios simultaneously. In the coming years, while striving to anchor the United States in Europe (which also aligns with U.S. strategic interests), NATO's European members must quickly assume greater responsibility for their own security and defense to offset the impact of Washington's newfound unpredictability.

The report concludes by stating that Europe must rethink its role and recognize its potential as a global power. The challenge lies not only in replacing the United States as the primary pillar of NATO's military strength; the EU, by developing stronger security and defense capabilities, must become a new life insurance policy. Regardless of U.S. participation, NATO must be maintained as the institutional framework for organizing collective defense. The real difficulty lies not in the funds to purchase and deploy weapons, but in issues of time and structure: How much time do European allies have to build European defense? How strong should it be? What new leadership structure should guide it? For instance, relocating alliance command structures from Norfolk to Northwood or from Mons back to Rocquencourt presents relatively minor logistical challenges, but is Europe prepared to accept a new military command architecture under British-German-French leadership, or even a German Supreme Allied Commander Europe? These difficult and existential questions urgently require answers from Berlin, London, Paris, as well as Rome and Warsaw.