De-Hamasization in the Gaza Strip: Drawing Lessons from Western and Arab De-Radicalization Models

Key Chapter Titles

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. Chapter 1: Radicalization - Concepts, Drivers, and Mechanisms
4. Chapter 2: Radicalization and Hamasization in the Gaza Strip
5. Chapter 3: De-Hamasization as the Overarching Framework for De-radicalization in the Gaza Strip
6. Chapter 4: Western Models of De-radicalization
7. Chapter 5: De-radicalization in Arab States - Models and Case Studies
8. Chapter 6: From Radicalization to De-radicalization in Gaza - Recommendations
9. References

Document Overview

This report, published by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) of Israel, aims to provide a rigorous analytical framework and an action blueprint for the core post-war challenge in the Gaza Strip: de-Hamasization. The report points out that since Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, it has systematically implanted its extreme, violent religious-nationalist ideology by dominating governance and societal institutions such as education, religion, welfare, the public sector, media, and public ceremonies. This has led to a profound process of Hamasization within Gazan Palestinian society. The core of this worldview is the conviction that the conflict must be resolved by completely destroying Israel through violent means. The report argues that following the unprecedented destruction caused by the war triggered by the October 7 massacre, merely rebuilding physical infrastructure is insufficient for achieving stability. Sustainable reconstruction must simultaneously commit to reshaping the social and human foundations, steering them away from Hamas's worldview and towards a more moderate political-ideological framework for managing the Palestinian national struggle.

The report first conceptually defines radicalization and de-radicalization, emphasizing that de-Hamasization does not negate the legitimacy of non-violent Palestinian political struggle. It specifically refers to eradicating the uncompromising, violent struggle worldview aimed at Israel's destruction. Based on academic literature, the study proposes a multi-level action framework: the micro-level focuses on transforming individual identity, attitudes, and emotions; the meso-level involves families, communities, and faith networks; the macro-level concentrates on governance, educational, religious, and economic institutions. Simultaneously, the report analyzes two dynamics: push factors, which expel individuals from extremist ideologies and organizational frameworks (e.g., military defeat, ideological rupture); and pull factors, which attract individuals towards more moderate orientations (e.g., offering political-economic hope, fostering moderate civic and religious norms).

To draw lessons, the report conducts in-depth comparative case studies. On one hand, it examines Western-led de-radicalization models, including successful cases like post-World War II Germany (collapse and reshaping of political culture) and Japan (institutional continuity and ideological transformation), as well as cases with limitations or failures such as Iraq (exclusion and backlash), Afghanistan (fragmentation without transformation), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (preservation of existing narratives and segregation). The report notes that while the Western models are instructive, their success often relies on specific conditions like the complete occupation of the defeated state and the total destruction of the old regime, conditions difficult to replicate in the Gaza context.

On the other hand, the report innovatively and systematically introduces case studies of de-radicalization from Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia. These cases demonstrate state-led, comprehensive approaches combining security measures with broad socio-economic, religious, and educational reforms. Their common features include: utilizing local religious authorities to reshape moderate religious discourse; integrating de-radicalization programs with vocational training and economic incentives; and the deep involvement of security agencies in monitoring, rehabilitation, and reintegration processes. The report suggests that the Arab models, due to their cultural, religious, and regional proximity, may offer more relevant and feasible lessons for Gaza than Western models.

Based on the above theoretical and case analyses, and considering the unique characteristics of the Gaza Strip—including its profound collective trauma, structural crises, the continued presence of Hamas as a dominant local political actor, and the potential post-war international decision-making environment involving multiple actors such as the United States, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt—the report proposes specific recommendations for Gaza in its final chapter. These recommendations aim to construct an integrated action plan to collectively drive Gazan society's transformation from Hamasization towards sustainable peace and stability. This would be achieved through a credible political horizon, large-scale reconstruction, alternative religious-social frameworks mediated by credible local actors, and broad participation from Arab states. The report emphasizes that achieving de-Hamasization is a vital interest for Israel's security and civil stability; otherwise, the ruins of Gaza may breed the next generation of uncompromising extremism against Israel.