Subverting the Script: Redesigning the U.S. Air Force for Decisive Advantage
This report proposes an innovative four-part air force design that aims to reshape the U.S. Air Force's presence in the Indo-Pacific through forward-deployed "edge forces", in-depth strikes "pulse forces", locally supported "core forces" and a resilient airport network. The balance of combat effectiveness and deterrence under reciprocal threats in the region.
Detail
Published
07/03/2026
Key Chapter Titles
- Introduction
- Drivers of Change
- The Four-Component Force Design
- Employing the Edge Force to Fight Forward
- Wielding the Scalpel and Sledgehammer of the Pulse Force
- Strong Core Force, Strong Air Force
- The Foundation of Resilient Basing
- Integrated Operations
- Force Architecture and Scenario Analysis Insights
- Different Approaches to Force Employment
- Implementing the Force Design
- Counterarguments and Conclusion
Document Overview
Although the U.S. Air Force has performed well in recent operations, its aging fleet, low readiness rates, and bleak outlook in a potential future conflict with China suggest the service could transition from indispensable to incapable within a decade. More critically, a weakened Air Force would face significant challenges in defending the homeland, maintaining strategic deterrence, and providing power projection for the nation, potentially increasing the likelihood of the People's Republic of China initiating and winning a war against the United States and its allies. The report notes that the U.S. Air Force's traditional expeditionary and sequential power projection model is increasingly ineffective against a peer threat like China, due to: China's ability to target the incremental deployment of U.S. forces to the Indo-Pacific at scale; the vulnerability of air bases once U.S. forces arrive; China potentially achieving its aggressive objectives (such as invading Taiwan or seizing other allied territory) before the U.S. can roll back enemy defenses to strike its centers of gravity; and the Air Force's difficulty in reconstituting losses, let alone scaling up, if conflict persists. Analysis indicates that without a viable transformation, even with more aircraft, weapons, or readiness funding, China could likely defeat the United States and its allies in a major campaign within ten years.
The report argues that instead of passively accepting existing problems, the Air Force should flip the script, creating new challenges for China while retaining necessary capabilities. Rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach, it proposes assigning required force design attributes to different components of its force and altering its deployment posture to overcome operational puzzles and create dilemmas for China. Simultaneously, it introduces specialized systems to address specific operational problems and efficiently maintain the service at an appropriate capability level.
Building upon the Air Force's nascent Integrated Force Design, this report proposes an innovative approach comprising three mutually reinforcing elements and key enablers: 1) A forward-deployed, mobile, and survivable Edge Force; 2) A Pulse Force projecting decisive firepower from depth; 3) A Core Force providing generative support for global operations. These elements are enabled by a resilient basing network and advanced command and control capabilities. This four-component force design aims to offset China's advantages in Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities through dispersal, specialization, and resilient deployment, creating multiple operational dilemmas.
Through detailed wargaming and scenario analysis, the report assesses the effectiveness of different force architectures in high-intensity conflict scenarios in the Indo-Pacific region. The analysis compares performance differences between traditional force designs, current planned pathways, and the proposed innovative design. Key findings include that the proposed design can more effectively sustain operational tempo in the initial stages of conflict, protect critical assets, and demonstrate greater resilience and sustainability in a protracted war. The report concludes by discussing the organizational, acquisition, and operational concept changes required to implement this force design, addresses potential counterarguments, and emphasizes the urgency of fundamental restructuring to meet the era of great power competition.