Iran Protests: Potential U.S. Responses and Issues Facing Congress

Key Chapter Title List

1. 2025-2026 Protests: Current Situation and Background
2. Differences Between the Recent Unrest and Previous Incidents
3. President Trump's Claimed Intent to Rescue Protesters
4. Potential U.S. Responses, Future Scenarios, and Implications for Congress
5. U.S.-Iran Negotiations
6. U.S. Military Action
7. Economic Pressure
8. Legislative and Oversight Actions Congress May Consider

Document Introduction

In late December 2025, nationwide protests erupted in Iran, triggered by merchants in Tehran's Grand Bazaar protesting the collapse of the Iranian rial (which lost about half its value in 2025). Economic grievances quickly spread from the merchant class, traditionally seen as supportive of the Islamic Republic, to a broader population, subsequently sparking larger protests in cities across all 31 of Iran's provinces. Although the government initially showed a conciliatory posture, it soon shifted to repression under a veil of information blackout, with even so-called moderates supporting the crackdown by characterizing the protests as a U.S.- and Israel-backed conspiracy. As of January 20, 2026, U.S.-based human rights groups reported over 26,000 arrests, 4,200 protester deaths, and 197 deaths among government-affiliated forces; other sources claimed casualty figures exceeded 12,000. This unprecedented repression reportedly reduced protest activity by mid-January, and as of January 21, a state described by some as de facto martial law appeared to have suppressed large-scale protests.

Compared to several nationwide upheavals in Iran over the past decade (such as the 2017-2018, 2019, and 2022-2023 Woman, Life, Freedom movement), this unrest exhibits several distinct characteristics. First, the Iranian government has fewer options. In the past, the government would make limited policy adjustments in addition to employing overwhelming violence from state security forces. However, given the depth of Iran's economic dislocation in 2025-2026 and the significant number of protesters demanding an end to Supreme Leader Khamenei's rule and even the Islamic Republic itself, the government seems to have fewer options for addressing grievances than before. Second, Iran's regional standing is weakened. Beyond the escalating financial crisis, recent military setbacks have placed Iran in one of its weakest strategic positions since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. In the 2024 direct conflict with Israel, Iran lost air defense and missile production capabilities; regional allies built up through decades of investment have been weakened (Hamas and Hezbollah) or completely collapsed (the Syrian Assad regime). The 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 saw U.S. airstrikes severely damage Iranian nuclear facilities, further degrading its strategic capabilities. These losses likely lead both Iranian leaders and protesters to view the protests and the possibility of foreign intervention as more concrete threats to the system.

On January 2, 2026, U.S. President Trump claimed on social media that the United States would rescue peaceful protesters if Iran shot them. This statement, combined with precedents of U.S. military force used in Iran in 2025 and in Venezuela in 2026, could influence the thinking or actions of Iranian protesters, security forces, or government officials. Some analysis suggests U.S. strikes could tip the balance in favor of protesters but also warns that the regime could still prevail even if Trump bombed the country. Similar to protest events over the past decade, the 2025-2026 protest movement appears to lack unified organization or leadership. Reza Pahlavi, the exiled Crown Prince representing the monarchy overthrown in the 1979 revolution, has played a more prominent role in this incident.

The report analyzes potential U.S. responses, future scenarios, and their implications for Congress. Potential scenarios include: U.S.-Iran negotiations, where Iranian leaders might negotiate to buy time or assess that a new agreement involving concessions on its nuclear program could reduce the likelihood of U.S. military action and potentially bring economic benefits; U.S. military action, where Congress has not authorized the use of force in Iran, but Iran's perceived weakness might be seen by proponents of U.S. action as an opportunity to change the Iranian government. However, according to open-source information, no large-scale defections have occurred thus far within the Iranian military, security forces, or political elite, which could limit the protesters' chances of success and the availability of internal partners for the U.S. to cooperate with to push for changes in government policy or personnel. Furthermore, Iranian security forces appear to have strong economic interests under the current system. Iranian officials have vowed to attack Israel and U.S. forces if the United States launches strikes. A prolonged military campaign in a large, complex country like Iran could entail costs, including humanitarian costs from regime change or prolonged civil strife. Reportedly, some U.S. partner countries in the region have privately warned against military action, fearing Iran might retaliate by disrupting oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

Regarding economic pressure, President Trump stated on January 12 that any country doing business with Iran would pay a 25% tariff on all its business with the United States. While the U.S. maintains comprehensive sanctions on many sectors of Iran's economy, other countries maintain relatively normal economic relations with Iran, with Germany, China, India, and Turkey being Iran's major import and export partners. On January 15, 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions against five Iranian officials, including two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the collapse of Iran's currency and other aspects of its economic crisis prove that the administration's maximum pressure strategy is working.

Congress may consider legislative and oversight actions related to the use of military force, U.S. diplomacy and international agreements, sanctions, and foreign assistance aimed at expanding internet access in Iran. Congressional responses to events in Iran and potential U.S. actions have included the introduction of relevant resolutions.