U.S.-Vietnam relations

Key Chapter Title List

1. Overview of U.S.-Vietnam Relations
2. Vietnam's Political Structure and Policy Direction
3. China-Vietnam Relations
4. Human Rights Situation
5. Economy and Trade
6. 2025 Trade Agreement Framework

Document Introduction

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1995, overlapping strategic and economic interests have driven the two countries to expand their connections across a wide range of issues. Particularly since 2010, the two governments, based on shared concerns regarding the increasingly assertive behavior of the People's Republic of China (China), have established a partnership on numerous regional security and economic matters. In 2023, the two countries elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In 2024, the United States was Vietnam's second-largest trading partner (after China), and Vietnam was the United States' eighth-largest trading partner. The second Trump administration continued many of its predecessor's efforts to strengthen bilateral security cooperation, while simultaneously imposing unilateral tariffs on Vietnam and announcing a framework for a bilateral trade agreement in October 2025.

This report provides an in-depth analysis of the driving forces and constraints in the development of U.S.-Vietnam relations. For decades, the U.S. Congress has played a significant role in shaping the course of U.S.-Vietnam relations. Some members have consistently been at the forefront of promoting improved relations, focusing on the human rights situation, and addressing legacies of the Vietnam War. If rumors of Vietnam's potential purchase of U.S. military aircraft materialize, Congress will have the opportunity to review such a sale. Furthermore, Congress may also oversee and review U.S. tariffs on Vietnam and the trade agreement reached in October 2025. However, further improvement in bilateral relations is limited in pace and scope by multiple factors: Vietnam typically needs to anticipate China's potential reactions before taking major foreign policy actions, especially towards the United States; although polls show the Vietnamese public holds a positive view of the United States, many Vietnamese officials suspect U.S. goals include ending the Vietnamese Communist Party's monopoly on power; U.S. concerns over Vietnam's human rights record (which has deteriorated over the past decade) have historically limited the types of cooperation the U.S. is willing to engage in, particularly in the security sphere. The second Trump administration's unilateral tariffs on Vietnam, sudden freezing and subsequent termination of some bilateral aid programs, and the Vietnamese leadership's reported perception that the administration's foreign policy decisions may be unpredictable are reportedly exacerbating Vietnamese doubts about U.S. reliability.

The report further analyzes Vietnam's domestic political landscape and its foreign policy orientation. Vietnam is a single-party authoritarian state ruled by the Vietnamese Communist Party, which sets the overall policy direction, while the government handles day-to-day implementation. Currently, the policy and political scene is increasingly dominated by preparations for the Communist Party's National Congress, scheduled for January 2026. This Congress will determine personnel arrangements and set the direction for Vietnam's economic, foreign, and social policies. Under the leadership of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Vietnam has restructured its political system, including streamlining regulations, cutting 20% of public sector positions, reducing the number of ministries from 22 to 14, merging some party and state agencies, and halving the number of provinces, aiming to become an upper-middle-income economy by 2030 and a high-income developed country by 2045. To achieve these goals, Vietnamese leaders have for over a decade worked to diversify its export markets and sources of foreign direct investment. In foreign policy, Vietnam's strategy includes enhancing its own defense capabilities and expanding security relations with the United States, Australia, India, and Japan as a means to hedge against China. A stated principle of its foreign policy is to avoid excessive dependence on any single country or group of countries. This pursuit of balance, coupled with caution against provoking China, has led Vietnam to expand its relations with the United States in a gradual and non-linear manner.

China-Vietnam relations are Vietnam's most important bilateral relationship. The two countries share a communist-led political system, which provides party-to-party communication channels and shapes similar official worldviews. China is Vietnam's largest trading partner. Since 2022 (including during Chinese leader Xi Jinping's visit to Hanoi in April 2025), the two sides have signed dozens of economic agreements aimed at upgrading transportation links, among other things. However, China-Vietnam relations are prone to tensions, particularly regarding China's dam-building on the upper Mekong River and the two countries' competing claims in the South China Sea. The U.S. government has consistently sought to enhance Vietnam's ability to maintain maritime domain awareness and patrol its coastal waters. The Obama administration, the first Trump administration, and the Biden administration provided Vietnam with 24 new Coast Guard patrol boats, unmanned aerial systems, coastal radar, and three decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard cutters (which are Vietnam's largest coast guard vessels). In November 2025, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visited Vietnam, where the two sides discussed deepening defense cooperation.

In the field of human rights, over the past three decades, the Vietnamese Communist Party appears to have followed a strategy of allowing various forms of individual and religious expression while selectively suppressing individuals and organizations it deems a threat to the party's monopoly on power. Over the past decade, suppression of dissent has intensified, with the government enhancing its ability to use legal and technological means to monitor Vietnamese citizens' social media activities. The Vietnam Human Rights Act proposed in the 119th U.S. Congress states that the President should impose sanctions on Vietnamese government officials found to be involved in various human rights abuses.

In terms of economy and trade, over the past decade, Vietnam has become a major manufacturing hub and entered the ranks of the United States' top ten trading partners. According to U.S. data, bilateral goods trade has more than tripled over the past decade, reaching $150 billion in 2024. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Vietnam in 2024 ($123 billion) was the United States' third-largest trade deficit. Vietnam is a major source of U.S. imports of consumer electronics, furniture, semiconductors and components, apparel, and footwear. The main U.S. goods exports to Vietnam are cotton, civilian aircraft and parts, semiconductors, and various agricultural products. In 2024, the United States had a $1.7 billion surplus in bilateral services trade with Vietnam. As bilateral trade flows have grown, driven by Vietnam's relatively low wages, market-oriented economic reforms, and political stability, U.S. business interest in Vietnam has increased. Several trends, including rising production costs in China, U.S. tariffs on Chinese products, supply chain diversification, and the entry into force of regional trade agreements between Vietnam and major East Asian trading partners, have enhanced Vietnam's appeal to foreign investors, including Chinese companies. In 2024, U.S. foreign direct investment in Vietnam was $4.4 billion, an 8% increase from 2023. The U.S. government has pointed to Vietnam's high tariffs on food and agricultural products, lack of regulatory transparency, insufficient intellectual property protection, and digital trade issues as trade barriers. On October 26, 2025, the United States and Vietnam issued a joint statement on a framework for a reciprocal, fair, and balanced trade agreement. The potential agreement aims to address: U.S. industrial and agricultural market access to Vietnam; Vietnam's non-tariff barriers; digital trade, services, and investment commitments; and cooperation on supply chain resilience (including cooperation on tariff evasion and export controls), among other things. U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese goods will remain at 20%, except for certain products not produced in the United States. The statement noted that both countries would undertake domestic procedures for the agreement to take effect but did not specify whether the President would seek congressional approval. The joint statement did not address potential sectoral tariffs that could affect Vietnamese industries, as the Trump administration is conducting national security investigations into various imports, including semiconductors.