The Implications of the Ukraine War on the Space Domain: Challenges and Opportunities in Future Conflicts

Key Chapter Title List

1. Abstract
2. Research Questions
3. Research Methodology
4. Key Findings
5. Recommendations

Document Introduction

This report, commissioned by the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Space Force's Space Operations Command to the RAND Corporation, aims to systematically analyze space domain activities in the Russia-Ukraine War since its full-scale outbreak in February 2022 through open-source analysis, and extract lessons learned with significant reference value for future conflicts. The report focuses on the unprecedented role of space services and their denial in contemporary warfare, arguing that this conflict provides a crucial case study for understanding how space shapes future battlefields and how the United States and its allies should prepare.

The research centers on three major space mission areas proven most influential on the Ukrainian battlefield: satellite communications, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). For each area, the report first assesses the pre-war capability baselines of Ukraine and Russia, then provides a detailed analysis of the actual application of these capabilities during the war, the interference and disruption they suffered, and identifies the related challenges and issues faced by key stakeholders in the conflict. The analysis primarily relies on publicly available information, including public statements from Western, Ukrainian, and Russian officials, relevant literature from Russian and Ukrainian defense industries, and extensive open-source reporting.

The report's core findings reveal several key trends. First, critical space services are highly likely to face interference in future conflicts. The war demonstrates that ensuring one's own and/or denying the adversary's space services is increasingly vital for modern operations. Threats such as cyberattacks and GPS jamming have significantly impacted the course of the war, and the growing sophistication of Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities further increases the likelihood of similar interference for the United States and its allies in future conflicts. Second, the wide availability of space services increases battlefield transparency. Commercial satellite imagery and declassified intelligence provided timely warnings of Russia's initial offensive and improved situational awareness throughout the conflict. The widespread presence of commercial or declassified national imagery may make future large-scale conflicts relatively more visible to open-source intelligence and a broader audience.

Third, commercial space services bring both value and vulnerability. Ukraine's ability to leverage Western commercial services enhanced its operational effectiveness and reduced reliance on self-built capabilities. However, concerns about the reliability of Starlink partly stem from the unique and informal nature of its service provision to Ukraine (as such services are typically contract-bound). Hesitation from Taiwan and other countries regarding SpaceX highlights potential caution among nations about relying on a single supplier. Finally, the report points out that future wars will present unique challenges and opportunities across different space mission areas: In satellite communications, the Ukraine war demonstrated the potential utility of distributed satellite communication architectures in empowering ground forces, while the Viasat hack revealed the vulnerability of any single supplier. In PNT, the war indicates that space-based Global Navigation Satellite Systems are highly likely to continue facing challenges from ground-based jamming. In ISR, commercial products or shared partner products can substitute for national capabilities, but over-reliance on shared capabilities may weaken the operational freedom of U.S. partners. Simultaneously, improvements in commercial imagery capabilities and accessibility could also benefit adversaries. Space capabilities, including ISR, will increasingly require careful management to limit risks of misuse or cyber penetration.

Based on the above analysis, the report proposes one overarching recommendation: The United States should develop plans to utilize commercial space assets to support allies and partners before and during the outbreak of future conflicts. The Ukraine war has proven that leveraging commercial resources can benefit U.S. allies and partners involved in a conflict. This recommendation points to a strategic path of integrating commercial capabilities to enhance alliance resilience and address future hybrid threats in the space domain.