Prospects for North Korea's Domestic Political Situation in 2024

Key Chapter Title List

1. Political Trends
2. Personnel Changes and Possibility of Party Statute Revisions
3. The Rise of Kim Ju Ae and the Succession Issue
4. Analysis of Kim Jong Un's Public Activities
5. Military Trends and Weapons System Development
6. Social Sector (Healthcare and Ideology/Culture)
7. Healthcare
8. Ideology and Culture
9. Analysis and Implications

Document Introduction

This report aims to systematically analyze the main trends displayed by North Korea in the political, military, and social sectors in 2025, and based on this, provide a forward-looking assessment of key developments in 2026, particularly around the anticipated 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea expected at the beginning of the year. The report posits that significant changes have already occurred in the past year in North Korea's domestic politics, military, and social ideology, and the upcoming Party Congress is expected to trigger adjustments in the composition of the political system, elite turnover, and the announcement of a series of important strategic concepts, including a new five-year plan for defense science development and weapons system development, as well as a national economic development plan.

In the political sphere, the report focuses on personnel changes, potential institutional adjustments, and the power succession issue. In early 2025, the Premier of the Cabinet was changed from Kim Tok Hun to Pak Tae Song, an action interpreted as a renewed emphasis by the Kim Jong Un regime on the science and technology sector. Concurrently, the new Vice Premier of the Cabinet, Kim Jong Kwan, has a military background, possibly indicating Kim Jong Un's intention to involve the military more deeply in the Cabinet's economic operations. The report analyzes a series of high-level military personnel changes triggered by the Kanggeonho destroyer incident, pointing out that this reflects Kim Jong Un's style of performance-based cadre management principles. Looking ahead to 2026, the Party Congress will provide an opportunity for large-scale personnel changes in core power institutions such as the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, the Party Secretariat, and the military, with the scale of expected personnel shifts predicted to be considerable. Furthermore, the Party Congress may be accompanied by structural reorganization of the Party Statute and the Party-state system, potentially further elevating the status of Kim Jong Un's ideology. Regarding the succession issue, the report analyzes Kim Ju Ae's increasingly frequent public activities and her symbolic significance within the power structure, while also discussing the controversy over whether Kim Jong Un has a son. It concludes that the likelihood of Kim Ju Ae being formally established as the successor in the short term is low. Analysis of Kim Jong Un's public activities in 2025 shows that while his focus remains on the military sector, diplomatic activities have increased significantly, economic-related activities have decreased, and the size of his entourage has shrunk, suggesting a possible further concentration of the core decision-making circle.

In the military sphere, the report assesses North Korea's continued progress under the five-year plan for defense science development and weapons system development proposed at the 8th Party Congress in 2016. In 2025, North Korea continued testing various new and old weapon systems, including hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missiles, ship-launched strategic cruise missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, new air defense systems, and attack drones. The report notes that although the frequency of tests directly related to the nuclear program has decreased compared to 2022-2024, North Korea's military modernization process is still deepening and expanding, with key areas covering nuclear-powered missile submarines, new unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities, missile defense systems, new intercontinental ballistic missiles, and surface vessel combat capabilities. Many systems remain in the development or testing phase, with key projects such as the super-large nuclear warhead, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) ICBMs, and submarine-launched ICBMs yet to be tested. The report also mentions North Korea's increasingly sophisticated cyber capabilities and the trend of artificial intelligence potentially being more widely applied in weapon systems.

In the social sphere, the report focuses on two dimensions: healthcare and ideology/culture. As part of the 20x10 local industry policy, North Korea continues to increase investment in the healthcare sector, exemplified by the Pyongyang General Hospital, but faces challenges such as shortages of advanced medical equipment, construction delays, and a lack of specialized medical personnel. Kim Jong Un inspected multiple hospital construction sites, planning to simultaneously build hospitals in 20 cities and counties annually starting from 2026. However, the report considers this goal overly ambitious and likely subject to adjustment. In the realm of ideology and culture, the report analyzes the ongoing ideological offensive within North Korea since Kim Jong Un proposed the "two hostile states theory" at the end of 2023 and declared the formal end of the peaceful reunification line with South Korea. North Korean leadership has repeatedly stated its intention to legalize relations with South Korea and border issues, and to criticize the South Korean populace collectively. This may indicate a further strengthening of dehumanizing narratives about South Korea in domestic propaganda. Simultaneously, North Korean authorities are also attempting to improve the quality of local cultural content. For instance, the TV drama "New Spring in Baekhakwon" realistically depicts internal social problems. Such content reflects the regime's diagnosis of socio-economic ills and may also be used as a tool to convey behavioral norms to residents.

Based on the above analysis, the report concludes by extracting several policy implications. It points out that in the political sphere, the 2026 Party Congress may witness the promotion of young newcomers from local or mid-to-lower-level party and military cadres. Overall, this report provides a fact-based, in-depth analytical framework for understanding North Korea's current dynamics and anticipating its strategic direction in 2026.