Analysis of North Korea's New Year's Address and Outlook on the Situation

Key Chapter Title List

1. Overall Review of the 2026 New Year's Address
2. Politics
3. Military
4. Inter-Korean Relations
5. Economy and Society
6. External Environment
7. Current Status and Response Direction for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

Document Introduction

This report collection is based on the outcomes of a specialized seminar jointly held by Ewha Womans University's Institute for Unification Studies and the "Our Nation Mutual Aid Movement" on January 2, 2026. It compiles in-depth analysis and forward-looking assessments of North Korea's 2026 New Year's Address by four senior researchers. The report strictly adheres to North Korea's official public statements, Rodong Sinmun reports, and internal policy trends, aiming to provide professional audiences with authoritative, first-hand evaluations regarding North Korea's domestic and foreign affairs, military strategy, and the direction of the Korean Peninsula relations.

The core analysis revolves around North Korea's 2026 New Year's Address. The address evaluated 2025 as a year that achieved preliminary results in national balanced development and the "comprehensive development of socialist construction" by relying on the "people's patriotic sincerity." It emphasized that 2026 would continue to be based on patriotic unity, following the national development strategy to be formulated at the upcoming 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). The report points out that while the address did not specify the concrete strategic lines of the 9th Congress, its tone was a call for all people to "advance more vigorously and courageously."

In the political domain, the report provides a detailed assessment of North Korea's progress in 2025, which was based on completing the "Five Major Party Building Lines of the New Era" (political, organizational, ideological, disciplinary, and work style). This progress involved strengthening the ideology of "Kim Jong-unism," advancing the "revolutionization of cadres," and consolidating the sole leadership system of Kim Jong-un. The report specifically analyzes the "adjustment period tasks" proposed at the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 13th Central Committee of the WPK, convened ahead of schedule in December 2025. These tasks include strengthening defense capabilities, achievements from troop deployments to the Russia-Ukraine war, economic development goals and five-year plan completion, as well as party discipline rectification. Based on this, the report speculates that the 9th Party Congress might be slightly delayed. The report posits that the "Five Major Party Building Lines of the New Era" will serve as the overarching tone and ideological strategy during the design process of the 9th Congress. Its prototype can be traced back to the Five Major Party Building Lines of the Kim Il-sung era, aiming to strengthen Kim Jong-un's leader-dictatorship system and ultimately establish the core content of "Kim Jong-unism." Furthermore, the report delves into the long-term strategic trends of selecting new elites based on the standard of "loyalty" and legitimizing the fourth-generation hereditary succession by emphasizing the "succession issue."

In the military domain, the report assesses that in 2025, North Korea followed a realist line of "peace through strength," safeguarding national security and interests by strengthening defense capabilities and deploying troops to the Russia-Ukraine war. This tone is expected to continue in 2026, promoting the parallel construction of "advanced nuclear capabilities + conventional strategy." The report analyzes North Korea's moves to seek conventional military modernization, leveraging the opportunity presented by the Russia-Ukraine war while simultaneously advancing nuclear force sophistication. It predicts that the 9th Congress might re-emphasize military lines similar to the "Four Major Military Lines" of the 1960s (arming the entire population, cadres for the entire army, fortifying the entire region, modernizing the entire army). Concurrently, the report notes that North Korea is strengthening its "simultaneous symmetric and asymmetric strategy," developing hybrid warfare capabilities by combining sustained development of asymmetric forces (nuclear, missile, special operations, cyber) with conventional weapons production and artillery enhancement.

Regarding inter-Korean relations, the report, based on limited information, indicates that inter-Korean relations were at a stalemate in 2025. North Korea blamed South Korea for the stalled dialogue and continued military demonstrations and propaganda criticism. The New Year's Address did not directly mention South Korea or dialogue. The overall atmosphere was assessed as one of "ignoring and pressuring," suggesting that a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations in 2026 would be difficult. North Korea may be more inclined to address the peninsula situation by strengthening relations with countries like Russia.

This report collection integrates professional analysis across four major dimensions: politics and military, economy and society, external environment, and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. It employs methods such as textual analysis, historical comparison, policy trajectory tracking, and geopolitical assessment. Data sources include official reports from the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun, internal documents, and first-hand materials from authoritative research institutions. Its core findings reveal the coherent strategic logic of the North Korean regime in consolidating internal rule, advancing military modernization, and responding to external blockades. It holds significant reference value for understanding North Korea's policy direction, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, and formulating relevant response strategies.

Key Chapter Title List

1. Overall Review of the 2026 New Year's Address
2. Politics
3. Military
4. Inter-Korean Relations
5. Economy and Society
6. External Environment
7. Current Status and Response Direction for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation

Document Introduction

This report collection is based on the outcomes of a specialized seminar jointly held by Ewha Womans University's Institute for Unification Studies and the "Our Nation Mutual Aid Movement" on January 2, 2026. It compiles in-depth analysis and forward-looking assessments of North Korea's 2026 New Year's Address by four senior researchers. The report strictly adheres to North Korea's official public statements, Rodong Sinmun reports, and internal policy trends, aiming to provide professional audiences with authoritative, first-hand evaluations regarding North Korea's domestic and foreign affairs, military strategy, and the direction of the Korean Peninsula relations.

The core analysis revolves around North Korea's 2026 New Year's Address. The address evaluated 2025 as a year that achieved preliminary results in national balanced development and the "comprehensive development of socialist construction" by relying on the "people's patriotic sincerity." It emphasized that 2026 would continue to be based on patriotic unity, following the national development strategy to be formulated at the upcoming 9th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). The report points out that while the address did not specify the concrete strategic lines of the 9th Congress, its tone was a call for all people to "advance more vigorously and courageously."

In the political domain, the report provides a detailed assessment of North Korea's progress in 2025, which was based on completing the "Five Major Party Building Lines of the New Era" (political, organizational, ideological, disciplinary, and work style). This progress involved strengthening the ideology of "Kim Jong-unism," advancing the "revolutionization of cadres," and consolidating the sole leadership system of Kim Jong-un. The report specifically analyzes the "adjustment period tasks" proposed at the 8th Plenary Meeting of the 13th Central Committee of the WPK, convened ahead of schedule in December 2025. These tasks include strengthening defense capabilities, achievements from troop deployments to the Russia-Ukraine war, economic development goals and five-year plan completion, as well as party discipline rectification. Based on this, the report speculates that the 9th Party Congress might be slightly delayed. The report posits that the "Five Major Party Building Lines of the New Era" will serve as the overarching tone and ideological strategy during the design process of the 9th Congress. Its prototype can be traced back to the Five Major Party Building Lines of the Kim Il-sung era, aiming to strengthen Kim Jong-un's leader-dictatorship system and ultimately establish the core content of "Kim Jong-unism." Furthermore, the report delves into the long-term strategic trends of selecting new elites based on the standard of "loyalty" and legitimizing the fourth-generation hereditary succession by emphasizing the "succession issue."

In the military domain, the report assesses that in 2025, North Korea followed a realist line of "peace through strength," safeguarding national security and interests by strengthening defense capabilities and deploying troops to the Russia-Ukraine war. This tone is expected to continue in 2026, promoting the parallel construction of "advanced nuclear capabilities + conventional strategy." The report analyzes North Korea's moves to seek conventional military modernization, leveraging the opportunity presented by the Russia-Ukraine war while simultaneously advancing nuclear force sophistication. It predicts that the 9th Congress might re-emphasize military lines similar to the "Four Major Military Lines" of the 1960s (arming the entire population, cadres for the entire army, fortifying the entire region, modernizing the entire army). Concurrently, the report notes that North Korea is strengthening its "simultaneous symmetric and asymmetric strategy," developing hybrid warfare capabilities by combining sustained development of asymmetric forces (nuclear, missile, special operations, cyber) with conventional weapons production and artillery enhancement.

Regarding inter-Korean relations, the report, based on limited information, indicates that inter-Korean relations were at a stalemate in 2025. North Korea blamed South Korea for the stalled dialogue and continued military demonstrations and propaganda criticism. The New Year's Address did not directly mention South Korea or dialogue. The overall atmosphere was assessed as one of "ignoring and pressuring," suggesting that a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations in 2026 would be difficult. North Korea may be more inclined to address the peninsula situation by strengthening relations with countries like Russia.

This report collection integrates professional analysis across four major dimensions: politics and military, economy and society, external environment, and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. It employs methods such as textual analysis, historical comparison, policy trajectory tracking, and geopolitical assessment. Data sources include official reports from the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun, internal documents, and first-hand materials from authoritative research institutions. Its core findings reveal the coherent strategic logic of the North Korean regime in consolidating internal rule, advancing military modernization, and responding to external blockades. It holds significant reference value for understanding North Korea's policy direction, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, and formulating relevant response strategies.