Air Force Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) Program End-to-End Assessment Report

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. From Promise to Program: An Overview of Collaborative Combat Aircraft
2. The End-to-End Process Cycle: A Universal Framework
3. CCA Program Assessment
4. Ten Unanswered Questions
5. Executive Summary
6. Appendix A: Supporting Budget Data
7. List of Acronyms

Document Introduction

This report, authored by Travis Sharp, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), represents the first end-to-end in-depth assessment of the U.S. Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. Facing intensifying military competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region and the quantitative challenges posed by its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems, the U.S. Air Force introduced the "affordable mass" concept in 2023. It plans to procure approximately 1,000 CCA units to serve as "loyal wingmen" for manned fighter aircraft, aiming to build a large-scale unmanned wingman fleet at a relatively low cost to enhance system combat effectiveness and survivability.

The report employs the author's original "End-to-End Process Cycle (E2EPC)" analytical framework, which breaks down the generation of new military capabilities into seven interrelated steps: Define the Problem, Generate Resources, Develop Capabilities, Prepare the Organization, Deploy Capabilities, Employ Capabilities, and Adjust Practices. Using this framework, the report systematically examines the overall progress of the CCA program since its inception. The assessment is based on six categories of evidence: public information, briefings from Air Force officials, confidential interviews with over 30 industry experts, a confidential questionnaire survey of 38 experts from the Department of Defense, industry, and think tanks, a historical case study of the Vietnam War-era AQM-34 "Lightning Bug" drone, and an analysis of CCA employment, deployment, and sortie generation in a Taiwan Strait scenario.

The report's core findings reveal significant disparities in the program's progress across different stages. Notable progress has been made in "Define the Problem" and "Generate Resources," where the U.S. Air Force successfully framed the quantitative disadvantage of its manned fleet as a core challenge, established CCA as a promising solution, and secured strong initial funding support from Congress. However, progress has been limited or moderate in the three steps of "Develop Capabilities," "Deploy Capabilities," and "Employ Capabilities." While the Air Force has moved swiftly on technology prototyping, the definition of key mission roles (such as forward sensing, suppression of enemy air defenses, electronic warfare, etc.) remains vague, lacking clear trade-offs. This hinders deeper work on specific design, logistics support, and operational concepts. Furthermore, there is a notable lack of publicly available details and significant gaps regarding deployment issues such as CCA basing, sustainment, and cooperation with allies.

The report emphasizes two overarching macro-themes. First, "Technology is never enough." The success of CCA depends not only on advanced autonomous technology but equally on giving due attention to non-technical factors such as logistics support, basing choices, organizational integration, and tactical doctrine. Second, "Trade-offs: Now, Tomorrow, Forever." There is no "one-size-fits-all" CCA design suitable for all scenarios. In specific contingencies like a Taiwan Strait conflict, CCAs designed for "persistent presence" missions versus those for "shoot-and-scoot" missions will face vastly different design trade-offs regarding survivability, range, cost, and support requirements. The Air Force must make clear, mission-based decisions and communicate them widely as soon as possible.

Despite the challenges, the report maintains a cautiously optimistic view, believing the Air Force has laid a good foundation for CCA's success. The CCA program has garnered extraordinary implicit political support due to its symbolic significance—seen as a hope for breaking the deadlock of the Department of Defense's traditional acquisition model. The report concludes by posing ten unanswered key questions concerning the relationship between CCA and manned aircraft, organizational structure, personnel, and historical lessons, pointing the way for the program's future planning and debate. This assessment aims to provide policymakers, analysts, and relevant professionals with a comprehensive and rigorous benchmark to understand the true status and future path of this key program that may reshape the landscape of future air warfare.

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. From Promise to Program: An Overview of Collaborative Combat Aircraft
2. The End-to-End Process Cycle: A Universal Framework
3. CCA Program Assessment
4. Ten Unanswered Questions
5. Executive Summary
6. Appendix A: Supporting Budget Data
7. List of Acronyms

Document Introduction

This report, authored by Travis Sharp, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), represents the first end-to-end in-depth assessment of the U.S. Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. Facing intensifying military competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region and the quantitative challenges posed by its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems, the U.S. Air Force introduced the "affordable mass" concept in 2023. It plans to procure approximately 1,000 CCA units to serve as "loyal wingmen" for manned fighter aircraft, aiming to build a large-scale unmanned wingman fleet at a relatively low cost to enhance system combat effectiveness and survivability.

The report employs the author's original "End-to-End Process Cycle (E2EPC)" analytical framework, which breaks down the generation of new military capabilities into seven interrelated steps: Define the Problem, Generate Resources, Develop Capabilities, Prepare the Organization, Deploy Capabilities, Employ Capabilities, and Adjust Practices. Using this framework, the report systematically examines the overall progress of the CCA program since its inception. The assessment is based on six categories of evidence: public information, briefings from Air Force officials, confidential interviews with over 30 industry experts, a confidential questionnaire survey of 38 experts from the Department of Defense, industry, and think tanks, a historical case study of the Vietnam War-era AQM-34 "Lightning Bug" drone, and an analysis of CCA employment, deployment, and sortie generation in a Taiwan Strait scenario.

The report's core findings reveal significant disparities in the program's progress across different stages. Notable progress has been made in "Define the Problem" and "Generate Resources," where the U.S. Air Force successfully framed the quantitative disadvantage of its manned fleet as a core challenge, established CCA as a promising solution, and secured strong initial funding support from Congress. However, progress has been limited or moderate in the three steps of "Develop Capabilities," "Deploy Capabilities," and "Employ Capabilities." While the Air Force has moved swiftly on technology prototyping, the definition of key mission roles (such as forward sensing, suppression of enemy air defenses, electronic warfare, etc.) remains vague, lacking clear trade-offs. This hinders deeper work on specific design, logistics support, and operational concepts. Furthermore, there is a notable lack of publicly available details and significant gaps regarding deployment issues such as CCA basing, sustainment, and cooperation with allies.

The report emphasizes two overarching macro-themes. First, "Technology is never enough." The success of CCA depends not only on advanced autonomous technology but equally on giving due attention to non-technical factors such as logistics support, basing choices, organizational integration, and tactical doctrine. Second, "Trade-offs: Now, Tomorrow, Forever." There is no "one-size-fits-all" CCA design suitable for all scenarios. In specific contingencies like a Taiwan Strait conflict, CCAs designed for "persistent presence" missions versus those for "shoot-and-scoot" missions will face vastly different design trade-offs regarding survivability, range, cost, and support requirements. The Air Force must make clear, mission-based decisions and communicate them widely as soon as possible.

Despite the challenges, the report maintains a cautiously optimistic view, believing the Air Force has laid a good foundation for CCA's success. The CCA program has garnered extraordinary implicit political support due to its symbolic significance—seen as a hope for breaking the deadlock of the Department of Defense's traditional acquisition model. The report concludes by posing ten unanswered key questions concerning the relationship between CCA and manned aircraft, organizational structure, personnel, and historical lessons, pointing the way for the program's future planning and debate. This assessment aims to provide policymakers, analysts, and relevant professionals with a comprehensive and rigorous benchmark to understand the true status and future path of this key program that may reshape the landscape of future air warfare.