The Evolving Transatlantic Relationship: Implications for Mediterranean Security
This report provides an in-depth analysis of the significant adjustments in the global military posture brought about by the U.S. National Security Strategy report, focusing on the challenges of force realignment and burden-sharing in Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean region resulting from the shift of U.S. strategic focus toward the Americas and the Indo-Pacific.
Detail
Published
10/01/2026
Document Introduction
The U.S. National Security Strategy released at the end of 2025 marks a significant shift in its global military posture. Its core is to re-establish America's "position of excellence" in the Western Hemisphere and strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, which will inevitably lead to a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The report, authored by Stephen J. Flanagan, was completed under the framework of the "New (Dis)Order in the Mediterranean Strategic Group" project jointly led by the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. It aims to analyze the profound impact of this strategic adjustment on transatlantic relations and the Mediterranean security environment.
The report first dissects the two core geographical focal points of the 2025 National Security Strategy. First, the strategy unprecedentedly places "reaffirming U.S. excellence in the Western Hemisphere" at the forefront of foreign policy, proposes an expanded "Trump Corollary" to exclude extra-regional competitors, and undertakes significant military force redeployments for this purpose. This includes relocating the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caribbean and establishing a new Western Hemisphere Command. Second, the strategy continues to prioritize strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, advocating for achieving this goal through defense innovation, redeploying military assets from the Middle East and Europe, and pressuring East Asian allies for greater base access.
This strategic adjustment directly leads to an urgent demand for "burden shifting" in Europe and the Middle East. Although the National Security Strategy acknowledges that Europe remains strategically important to the United States, it clearly states that the Trump administration expects Europe and other allies to take primary responsibility for the defense of their respective regions. It sets an accelerated timeline requiring European allies to bear the majority of responsibility for conventional defense of the European continent by 2027. The U.S. Congress, through the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, has established legislative hurdles to limit hasty U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe, mandating strict assessment and consultation for any withdrawal actions. In the Middle East, the report argues that due to energy supply diversification, deepening regional partnerships, and pressure on Iran, core U.S. interests in the region have narrowed to protecting Gulf energy, safeguarding freedom of navigation, ensuring Israeli security, and combating terrorist organizations. This provides a rationale for reducing and adjusting the U.S. military presence in the Middle East.
The report further explores the specific impacts of a potential reduction in the U.S. military presence on Mediterranean security. Deployments of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in Italy and Germany may be reduced, and the number of forward-deployed missile destroyers in Rota, Spain, may also be adjusted. Facing the potential reduction of U.S. carrier strike group deployments in the Mediterranean, the report assesses the prospects for European allies to fill capability gaps. It focuses on analyzing the "European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative" composed of major European navies such as those of the UK, France, and Italy, and the enhancement of their joint amphibious warfare capabilities. Simultaneously, the report pays special attention to Turkey's growing expeditionary naval and amphibious forces (such as the TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship) and their role in operations in regions like the Mediterranean. However, it also notes that Turkey's actions in Libya and Syria, as well as its interests in the Horn of Africa, sometimes diverge from those of its allies.
Finally, the report examines the prospects for U.S.-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean region. Given the Trump administration's negative view of EU activities in its periphery, U.S. support for regional initiatives like the EU's "Mediterranean Pact" is expected to be limited. Cooperation between the two sides may be confined to specific functional areas of shared interest, such as disaster assistance, counter-terrorism, and border security and migration control. There is likely to be little room for broader political cooperation, such as in forums promoting peace and stability in South Mediterranean countries. Overall, this report provides an authoritative and detailed analysis for understanding the evolution of transatlantic defense relations under the shift in U.S. strategic focus and the impending reorganization of the security landscape in the Mediterranean region.
Document Introduction
The U.S. National Security Strategy released at the end of 2025 marks a significant shift in its global military posture. Its core is to re-establish America's "position of excellence" in the Western Hemisphere and strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, which will inevitably lead to a significant reduction in the U.S. military presence in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The report, authored by Stephen J. Flanagan, was completed under the framework of the "New (Dis)Order in the Mediterranean Strategic Group" project jointly led by the Institute of International Affairs (IAI) and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. It aims to analyze the profound impact of this strategic adjustment on transatlantic relations and the Mediterranean security environment.
The report first dissects the two core geographical focal points of the 2025 National Security Strategy. First, the strategy unprecedentedly places "reaffirming U.S. excellence in the Western Hemisphere" at the forefront of foreign policy, proposes an expanded "Trump Corollary" to exclude extra-regional competitors, and undertakes significant military force redeployments for this purpose. This includes relocating the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Caribbean and establishing a new Western Hemisphere Command. Second, the strategy continues to prioritize strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region, advocating for achieving this goal through defense innovation, redeploying military assets from the Middle East and Europe, and pressuring East Asian allies for greater base access.
This strategic adjustment directly leads to an urgent demand for "burden shifting" in Europe and the Middle East. Although the National Security Strategy acknowledges that Europe remains strategically important to the United States, it clearly states that the Trump administration expects Europe and other allies to take primary responsibility for the defense of their respective regions. It sets an accelerated timeline requiring European allies to bear the majority of responsibility for conventional defense of the European continent by 2027. The U.S. Congress, through the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, has established legislative hurdles to limit hasty U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe, mandating strict assessment and consultation for any withdrawal actions. In the Middle East, the report argues that due to energy supply diversification, deepening regional partnerships, and pressure on Iran, core U.S. interests in the region have narrowed to protecting Gulf energy, safeguarding freedom of navigation, ensuring Israeli security, and combating terrorist organizations. This provides a rationale for reducing and adjusting the U.S. military presence in the Middle East.
The report further explores the specific impacts of a potential reduction in the U.S. military presence on Mediterranean security. Deployments of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in Italy and Germany may be reduced, and the number of forward-deployed missile destroyers in Rota, Spain, may also be adjusted. Facing the potential reduction of U.S. carrier strike group deployments in the Mediterranean, the report assesses the prospects for European allies to fill capability gaps. It focuses on analyzing the "European Carrier Group Interoperability Initiative" composed of major European navies such as those of the UK, France, and Italy, and the enhancement of their joint amphibious warfare capabilities. Simultaneously, the report pays special attention to Turkey's growing expeditionary naval and amphibious forces (such as the TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship) and their role in operations in regions like the Mediterranean. However, it also notes that Turkey's actions in Libya and Syria, as well as its interests in the Horn of Africa, sometimes diverge from those of its allies.
Finally, the report examines the prospects for U.S.-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean region. Given the Trump administration's negative view of EU activities in its periphery, U.S. support for regional initiatives like the EU's "Mediterranean Pact" is expected to be limited. Cooperation between the two sides may be confined to specific functional areas of shared interest, such as disaster assistance, counter-terrorism, and border security and migration control. There is likely to be little room for broader political cooperation, such as in forums promoting peace and stability in South Mediterranean countries. Overall, this report provides an authoritative and detailed analysis for understanding the evolution of transatlantic defense relations under the shift in U.S. strategic focus and the impending reorganization of the security landscape in the Mediterranean region.