Observation Report on Russia's "Troika": Analysis of Russian Military Operations and Tactics

Key Chapter Title List

1. Acknowledgments and Project Origins
2. War Function: Command and Control
3. War Function: Maneuver and Movement
4. War Function: Intelligence
5. War Function: Fires
6. Command and Control: Science or Art and Its Significance
7. Movement and Maneuver: A Russian Perspective
8. Overview and Summary of the Intelligence Function
9. Overview of the Fires War Function
10. Impact of Unmanned Aerial Systems on the Fires Element
11. Impact of Logistics on the Fires Element
12. Impact of Electronic Warfare on the Fires Element

Document Introduction

This report, "Troika Observations Report on Russia: Analysis of Russian Military Operations and Tactics," is an authoritative analytical collection compiled from the daily unclassified observation reports published by the "Troika" – a team of retired U.S. Army Russian language experts – since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on February 24, 2022. The project originated from an initiative by former U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commanding General Christopher G. Cavoli, aiming to address gaps in the U.S. military's regional expert understanding of the Russian Armed Forces. Following Russia's launch of the "special military operation" against Ukraine in February 2022, the Troika team tracked the war in real-time, providing immediate insights to over 3,500 senior U.S. Department of Defense military and civilian leaders through internal analysis and external email briefings (Troika Observations). This report represents a systematic compilation and in-depth analysis of thousands of pages of original observations from the first 27 months (up to May 1, 2024).

The report's core analytical framework employs the six "War Functions" defined by the U.S. Army's Field Manual 3-0, using them as a lens to examine the Russian military's performance on the Ukrainian battlefield. This framework was chosen to enable U.S. commanders and their staffs to more easily understand and contextualize Russian operational behavior based on a familiar military conceptual system. The report acknowledges that the Russian military itself does not use the concept of "War Functions," and that there are overlaps and gaps in observation across functional areas, but this framework provides an effective structure for systematic assessment.

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the Russian military's performance in the "Command and Control" function, revealing the severe challenges faced by its highly centralized and rigid organizational control system during the war. Despite the Russian military's emphasis on the "scientific" nature and centralization of command and control, in actual combat, forces were compelled to operate in smaller units, exposing issues such as inadequate junior leadership training, weak communications capabilities, inflexible logistics systems, and severe corruption. Particularly, the lack of non-commissioned officer leadership led to junior officers and even generals having to personally command from the front lines, exacerbating the fragility of the command chain and the risk of casualties. The report points out that frequent turnover in senior command personnel, along with early failures in mobilization and force generation capabilities, reflect deep-seated flaws in its command and control system when dealing with large-scale, protracted warfare.

Regarding "Maneuver and Movement," the report assesses the Russian military's tortuous journey from severe setbacks at the war's outset to limited improvements later on (e.g., capturing Avdiivka in 2024). The report posits that Russian strategic mobility (primarily reliant on domestic railways) is an inherent strength, but its operational and tactical mobility has long been clumsy, with most operational groups (except the Southern Group) initially lacking effective maneuver warfare capabilities. Russian airborne troops and naval infantry were used to seize key terrain in the initial offensive phases, but their tactics suffered from over-reliance on armored vehicles and a lack of a dismounted infantry culture. The report ultimately characterizes the Russian military's typical pattern as "fires, then maneuver," rather than coordinated "fires and maneuver," noting that the tactical coordination of the private military company Wagner in places like Bakhmut was a rare exception.

The "Intelligence" function chapter analyzes the Russian military's evolution from severely misjudging Ukraine's will and capacity to resist at the war's start to gradually adapting and developing a reconnaissance-strike complex centered on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The report notes that Russian human intelligence performed poorly due to systemic corruption and effective Ukrainian counterintelligence, leading to frequent targeting errors early on. However, through the large-scale deployment and improvement of UAV systems like the Orlan-10 and Orlan-30, and the adoption of Ukrainian tactical-technical procedures, the Russian military significantly enhanced its target acquisition, confirmation, and damage assessment capabilities, and to some extent realized its long-sought vision of a "reconnaissance-intelligence-strike complex."

The "Fires" function is the area where the report highlights the most significant improvements by the Russian military. By May 2024, through the integration of UAV reconnaissance, laser/satellite-guided munitions, aviation guided bombs, and cross-service (Army, Aerospace Forces) fires coordination, the Russian military achieved a shift from merely pursuing artillery shell expenditure to pursuing precision strike effects. Army-level artillery groups could coordinate various means such as Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems, and Aerospace Forces UMPK guided bombs to effectively strike high-value Ukrainian targets in depth. The report details the critical role of UAVs (particularly the Orlan-30 and Lancet) in target designation, fire adjustment, and communications relay, as well as new tactics developed by the Russian military, such as suppressing enemy air defenses and conducting operational pattern analysis.

In summary, through sustained and meticulous open-source intelligence analysis, this report depicts a picture of the Russian military slowly learning and painfully adapting amidst brutal combat. It emphasizes that the Russian military is a "thriving learning organization," and despite deep-rooted institutional weaknesses, its adaptability and the costs incurred to overcome difficulties should not be underestimated. This report provides valuable primary source material and in-depth analysis for professional researchers, military analysts, and policymakers to understand Russia's current military capabilities, operational thinking, and future evolutionary trends.