Observation Report on Russia's "Troika": Analysis of Russian Military Operations and Tactics

Key Chapter Title List

1. Acknowledgments and Project Origins
2. Warfare Function: Command and Control
3. Warfare Function: Maneuver and Movement
4. Warfare Function: Intelligence
5. Warfare Function: Fires
6. Command and Control: Science or Art and Its Significance
7. Movement and Maneuver: A Russian Perspective
8. Overview and Summary of the Intelligence Function
9. Overview of the Fires Warfare Function
10. Impact of Unmanned Aerial Systems on the Fires Element of Combat
11. Impact of Logistics on the Fires Element of Combat
12. Impact of Electronic Warfare on the Fires Element of Combat

Document Introduction

This report, "Troika Observations Report: Analysis of Russian Military Operations and Tactics," is an authoritative analytical compilation based on the daily unclassified observation reports issued by the Troika—a team of retired U.S. Army Russian language experts—since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on February 24, 2022. The project originated from an initiative by former U.S. Army Europe and Africa Commanding General, General Christopher G. Cavoli, aiming to address gaps in the U.S. military's regional expert understanding of the Russian Armed Forces. Following Russia's launch of the special military operation against Ukraine in February 2022, the Troika team tracked the war situation in real-time, providing immediate insights to over 3,500 senior U.S. Department of Defense military and civilian leaders through internal analysis and external email briefings (Troika Observations). This report represents a systematic organization and in-depth analysis of thousands of pages of raw observations from the first 27 months (up to May 1, 2024).

The report's core analytical framework employs the six warfare functions defined in the U.S. Army's Field Manual 3-0, using them as a lens to examine the performance of the Russian military in the Ukrainian theater. The selection of this framework aims to enable U.S. commanders and their staffs to more conveniently understand and contextualize Russian military operations based on a familiar system of military concepts. The report acknowledges that the Russian military itself does not use the concept of warfare functions, and that there are overlaps and gaps in observing the various functional areas. However, this framework provides an effective structure for systematic assessment.

The report provides an in-depth analysis of the Russian military's performance in the command and control function, revealing the severe challenges its highly centralized and rigid organizational control system has faced during the war. Although the Russian military emphasizes the scientific nature and centralization of command and control, in actual combat, forces were compelled to operate in smaller units, exposing issues such as insufficient junior leadership training, weak communications capabilities, inflexible logistics systems, and severe corruption. Particularly, the lack of non-commissioned officer leadership has forced junior officers and even generals to personally go to the front lines for direct command, exacerbating the fragility of the command chain and the risk of casualties. The report points out that frequent high-level command personnel changes in the Russian military, along with early failures in mobilization and force generation capabilities, reflect deep-seated flaws in its command and control system when dealing with large-scale, protracted warfare.

Regarding maneuver and movement, the report assesses the Russian military's tortuous journey from serious setbacks in the early stages of the war to limited improvements later on (such as the capture of Avdiivka in 2024). The report concludes that the Russian military's strategic mobility (primarily reliant on domestic railways) is an inherent strength, but its operational and tactical mobility has long been clumsy, with most operational groups (except the Southern Group of Forces) initially lacking effective maneuver warfare capabilities. Russian airborne troops and naval infantry were used to seize key terrain during the initial offensive phases, but their tactics suffered from issues such as over-reliance on armored vehicles and a lack of dismounted infantry culture. The report ultimately characterizes the typical Russian pattern as "fires, then maneuver," rather than coordinated fires and maneuver, noting that the tactical coordination of the private military company Wagner in places like Bakhmut was a rare exception.

The chapter on the intelligence function analyzes the Russian military's evolution from severely misjudging Ukraine's will and capacity to resist at the war's outset, to gradually adapting and developing a drone-centric reconnaissance-strike complex. The report notes that Russian human intelligence performed poorly due to systemic corruption and effective Ukrainian counterintelligence, leading to frequent targeting errors early on. However, through the large-scale deployment and improvement of drone systems like the Orlan-10 and Orlan-30, and the adoption of Ukrainian tactical technical procedures, the Russian military significantly enhanced its capabilities in target acquisition, confirmation, and damage assessment, to some extent realizing its long-pursued vision of a reconnaissance-intelligence-strike complex.

The fires function is the area where the report emphasizes the Russian military has made the most significant improvements. By May 2024, through the integration of drone reconnaissance, laser/satellite-guided munitions, aviation guided bombs, and cross-service (Army, Aerospace Forces) fires coordination, the Russian military achieved a shift from merely pursuing shell expenditure to pursuing precision strike effects. Army-level artillery groups were able to coordinate various means such as Iskander-M ballistic missiles, Tornado-S multiple launch rocket systems, and Aerospace Forces UMPK guided bombs to effectively strike high-value Ukrainian targets in depth. The report details the crucial role of drones (particularly the Orlan-30 and Lancet) in target designation, fire adjustment, and communications relay, as well as the Russian military's development of new tactics such as suppressing enemy air defenses and conducting operational pattern analysis.

In summary, through continuous and meticulous open-source intelligence analysis, this report depicts a picture of the Russian military slowly learning and painfully adapting amidst brutal combat. It emphasizes that the Russian military is a vibrant learning organization, and despite deep-rooted institutional weaknesses, its adaptability and the costs it incurs to overcome difficulties should not be underestimated. This report provides valuable firsthand information and in-depth analysis for professional researchers, military analysts, and policymakers to understand Russia's current military capabilities, operational thinking, and future evolutionary trends.