U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: Where to Go from Here?

Key Chapter Title List

1. Introduction: DPRK Containment Should Be the Top Agenda
2. Historical Traceability: How We Got Here
3. Another Inflection Point in North Korea's Development Trajectory
4. The Biden Administration's Record on North Korea
5. A Second Trump Administration: A New Opportunity?
6. The Human Rights Imperative
7. Coalescing Policy Actions
8. Leveraging Existing Tools
9. Conclusion

Document Introduction

This report, released by the George W. Bush Institute, aims to conduct an in-depth examination of the persistent failures of U.S. policy toward North Korea and provide an analytical framework for future strategic adjustments. The report points out that for three decades, successive U.S. administrations have set the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) of North Korea as a long-term goal, codified through legislation such as the "North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016" and the "Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018," yet policy effectiveness has been minimal. North Korea has not only continued to advance its illegal weapons programs, conducting multiple nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile launches, but has also, following the Russia-Ukraine war, established a "new strategic alliance" with Russia involving substantive military assistance, constituting the "most serious threat" the U.S. has faced since the Korean War. The report argues that the roots of bipartisan policy failure run deep, necessitating a clear-eyed view of the North Korean regime's obstinacy driven by a survivalist logic, as well as the complex geopolitical challenges posed by political and economic support and sanctions-evasion channels provided by countries like China and Russia.

The report systematically outlines the historical trajectory of policy, from North Korea's exploitation of great-power contradictions to maintain regime survival after the Cold War, through key junctures such as the "Arduous March," withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and nuclear tests. It reveals how efforts by the U.S. and its allies to induce denuclearization through diplomatic engagement and coercive measures have repeatedly faltered. The report specifically analyzes the policy performance during the Biden administration, noting that while it attempted unconditional engagement and strengthened trilateral coordination among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea (e.g., facilitating the 2023 Camp David Summit), it achieved limited success in countering North Korea's increasingly assertive posture and the paralysis of UN Security Council sanctions mechanisms due to Russia's veto power, failing to effectively leverage congressionally authorized unilateral sanctions tools for pressure. With North Korea having enshrined a nuclear preemption policy in its constitution and expanded its nuclear arsenal, policy adjustment is urgently needed.

Regarding a potential second Trump administration, the report proposes three core policy objectives: First, despite unprecedented difficulty in achieving the CVID goal, it must remain the policy's North Star, as the failure of peaceful means would force the U.S. to consider more dangerous options. Second, existing sanctions on North Korea must be fully enforced, including secondary sanctions on global financial institutions like Chinese banks that assist North Korea in evading sanctions. Third, strategic and military cooperation with allies like South Korea and Japan must be consolidated and strengthened, maintaining and potentially enhancing the U.S. military presence in East Asia, while not excluding any response options, including previously discussed "bloody nose" limited strike strategies. The report emphasizes that President Trump's existing personal relationship with Kim Jong-un could be a potential asset for future negotiations.

The report uniquely emphasizes the necessity and operational feasibility of deeply integrating human rights issues into the security strategy toward North Korea. Citing the UN Commission of Inquiry report, it points out systematic, widespread, and grave human rights violations in North Korea, where its "totalitarian state" nature links internal oppression closely with external threats. The report reveals that revenue from human rights abuses may fund nuclear proliferation activities, and that China and Russia, by providing political support and assisting in evading energy and trade sanctions, effectively bolster North Korea's nuclear program and its repressive capabilities. Therefore, any comprehensive strategy should exploit the vulnerabilities of the North Korean regime and its "China-Russia-Iran-North Korea" allies on human rights issues.

To this end, the report proposes a series of specific policy recommendations: including elevating the visibility of human rights issues through high-level meetings with North Korean defectors and issuing atrocity determinations; more rigorously enforcing existing tools like the "North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act" and the "Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act" to sanction Chinese and Russian entities involved in North Korea-related human rights abuses and proliferation activities; advocating for the reauthorization of the expired "North Korean Human Rights Act" to support refugee resettlement and information penetration and democratic governance projects targeting North Korea; ensuring timely appointment and support for key positions such as the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights within the State Department. The report argues that only through such a "comprehensive and results-oriented" strategy that deeply integrates security and human rights policies, continuously applying external sanctions pressure while internally supporting the North Korean people, can pressure on North Korea be maximized. This would position the U.S. most advantageously, whether North Korea chooses to return to the negotiating table or continue confrontation.

The report's final conclusion states that three decades of failure demand honest reflection from the U.S. and its allies, along with coordinated policy steps to clearly convey to the North Korean regime that it must denuclearize or face existential danger. Although the task is daunting, North Korea's partial relaxation of its self-imposed blockade during the pandemic indicates that external pressure may create a "tipping point" that could force Pyongyang to compromise. The U.S. should not accept failure as a foregone conclusion but should persist in pursuing a comprehensive policy that effectively ends the North Korean threat and compels its compliance with international obligations.