In-Depth Assessment Report on the Feasibility of Replicating the Venezuela Model in Iran

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Executive Summary
2. Intelligence Evidence Chain
3. Scenario Simulation
4. Sustained Monitoring Plan
5. Critical Thinking Reflection

Document Introduction

This report aims to conduct an in-depth strategic and tactical feasibility assessment of whether and how the United States and Israel might replicate the model of "Operation Absolute Resolve," successfully executed against Venezuelan President Maduro in January 2026, and apply it to Iran. The study focuses on the critical time window from late 2025 to early 2026. The core issue is to assess the possibility, complex constraints, and potential consequences of a joint U.S.-Israeli surgical decapitation strike against Iran's supreme leadership.

The main body of the report constructs a multi-dimensional analytical framework. First, by dissecting the execution details of "Operation Absolute Resolve" in Venezuela, including large-scale joint airstrikes, comprehensive air defense suppression, nighttime special forces infiltration, and real-time command, a benchmark model for modern joint special operations is established. Subsequently, the report systematically compares the target environments of Iran and Venezuela across key dimensions such as territorial depth, population security control, military defense capabilities (especially multi-layered air defense networks), number of core strike targets, and external support (primarily from Russia and China). It clearly indicates that Iran is more complex and challenging than Venezuela in almost all aspects, making the direct replication of the model highly risky in terms of combat and geopolitical cost.

Based on the above foundational analysis, the report employs a competitive hypothesis analysis matrix to quantitatively assess the likelihood of four main action hypotheses, including: 1) Executing a Venezuela-style decapitation operation in the first quarter of 2026; 2) Conducting limited airstrikes against key targets without ground infiltration; 3) Maintaining high-pressure deterrence and supporting internal change; 4) Sustaining deterrence without direct military action. The analysis points out that Hypothesis 2 (limited airstrikes) is the most balanced and feasible under current conditions, while fully replicating the decapitation model (Hypothesis 1) has a lower probability (approximately 30%-45%), primarily constrained by Iran's robust air defense system, complex geography and command structure, potential intervention by major powers like Russia, and Iran's potential for devastating retaliation.

To deepen understanding further, the report conducted Red Team/Blue Team scenario simulations. The Red Team (from Iran's perspective) simulated how Iran might anticipate the U.S.-Israeli action window, analyze potential infiltration routes, and design secure hideouts and emergency succession plans for the Supreme Leader. The Blue Team (from the U.S.-Israeli perspective) focused on exploring how to suppress Iran's multi-layered air defense, exploit potential chaos from leadership transitions, and maintain operational surprise. Based on these simulations, the report constructed four specific scenarios: Scenario One (Baseline Scenario) involves limited airstrikes and indirect decapitation; Scenario Two involves Iran initiating a preemptive strike leading to full-scale conflict; Scenario Three involves the peaceful internal collapse of the Iranian regime; Scenario Four (Black Swan Scenario) involves direct Russian military intervention. The report assesses that Scenario One (limited escalation) is the most likely to occur, while Scenario Two (full-scale war), though low in probability, would be extremely destructive.

Finally, the report developed a 30-day sustained monitoring plan, listing key observation indicators that might indicate impending war (IOC) versus those merely showing deterrence (IOW), and identified current intelligence gaps (such as the movement of the U.S. second aircraft carrier, the precise whereabouts of Khamenei, the delivery timeline of Russian S-400 systems, etc.). Simultaneously, the report proposed specific recommendations for improving the early warning system, including utilizing commercial satellites and AI monitoring, enhancing signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance, conducting social media sentiment analysis, and building human intelligence (HUMINT) networks.

The analysis in this report is based on multi-source cross-verification of extensive open-source intelligence (OSINT), referencing mainstream international media, think tank reports, and government statements. It is consistently guided by critical reflection, acknowledging that the primary sources of predictive uncertainty stem from Iran's internal dynamics and the psychology of U.S. decision-makers. The report's conclusion emphasizes that, although the U.S. and Israel possess the corresponding military capabilities and strategic motives, the feasibility of fully replicating the "Venezuela Model" to conduct a decapitation strike against Iran is limited in the foreseeable future. A more likely choice is to maintain high-intensity deterrence, combined with limited precision strikes, supplemented by a comprehensive strategy to promote internal evolution within Iran.

List of Key Chapter Titles

1. Executive Summary
2. Intelligence Evidence Chain
3. Scenario Simulation
4. Sustained Monitoring Plan
5. Critical Thinking Reflection

Document Introduction

This report aims to conduct an in-depth strategic and tactical feasibility assessment of whether and how the United States and Israel might replicate the model of "Operation Absolute Resolve," successfully executed against Venezuelan President Maduro in January 2026, and apply it to Iran. The study focuses on the critical time window from late 2025 to early 2026. The core issue is to assess the possibility, complex constraints, and potential consequences of a joint U.S.-Israeli surgical decapitation strike against Iran's supreme leadership.

The main body of the report constructs a multi-dimensional analytical framework. First, by dissecting the execution details of "Operation Absolute Resolve" in Venezuela, including large-scale joint airstrikes, comprehensive air defense suppression, nighttime special forces infiltration, and real-time command, a benchmark model for modern joint special operations is established. Subsequently, the report systematically compares the target environments of Iran and Venezuela across key dimensions such as territorial depth, population security control, military defense capabilities (especially multi-layered air defense networks), number of core strike targets, and external support (primarily from Russia and China). It clearly indicates that Iran is more complex and challenging than Venezuela in almost all aspects, making the direct replication of the model highly risky in terms of combat and geopolitical cost.

Based on the above foundational analysis, the report employs a competitive hypothesis analysis matrix to quantitatively assess the likelihood of four main action hypotheses, including: 1) Executing a Venezuela-style decapitation operation in the first quarter of 2026; 2) Conducting limited airstrikes against key targets without ground infiltration; 3) Maintaining high-pressure deterrence and supporting internal change; 4) Sustaining deterrence without direct military action. The analysis points out that Hypothesis 2 (limited airstrikes) is the most balanced and feasible under current conditions, while fully replicating the decapitation model (Hypothesis 1) has a lower probability (approximately 30%-45%), primarily constrained by Iran's robust air defense system, complex geography and command structure, potential intervention by major powers like Russia, and Iran's potential for devastating retaliation.

To deepen understanding further, the report conducted Red Team/Blue Team scenario simulations. The Red Team (from Iran's perspective) simulated how Iran might anticipate the U.S.-Israeli action window, analyze potential infiltration routes, and design secure hideouts and emergency succession plans for the Supreme Leader. The Blue Team (from the U.S.-Israeli perspective) focused on exploring how to suppress Iran's multi-layered air defense, exploit potential chaos from leadership transitions, and maintain operational surprise. Based on these simulations, the report constructed four specific scenarios: Scenario One (Baseline Scenario) involves limited airstrikes and indirect decapitation; Scenario Two involves Iran initiating a preemptive strike leading to full-scale conflict; Scenario Three involves the peaceful internal collapse of the Iranian regime; Scenario Four (Black Swan Scenario) involves direct Russian military intervention. The report assesses that Scenario One (limited escalation) is the most likely to occur, while Scenario Two (full-scale war), though low in probability, would be extremely destructive.

Finally, the report developed a 30-day sustained monitoring plan, listing key observation indicators that might indicate impending war (IOC) versus those merely showing deterrence (IOW), and identified current intelligence gaps (such as the movement of the U.S. second aircraft carrier, the precise whereabouts of Khamenei, the delivery timeline of Russian S-400 systems, etc.). Simultaneously, the report proposed specific recommendations for improving the early warning system, including utilizing commercial satellites and AI monitoring, enhancing signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance, conducting social media sentiment analysis, and building human intelligence (HUMINT) networks.

The analysis in this report is based on multi-source cross-verification of extensive open-source intelligence (OSINT), referencing mainstream international media, think tank reports, and government statements. It is consistently guided by critical reflection, acknowledging that the primary sources of predictive uncertainty stem from Iran's internal dynamics and the psychology of U.S. decision-makers. The report's conclusion emphasizes that, although the U.S. and Israel possess the corresponding military capabilities and strategic motives, the feasibility of fully replicating the "Venezuela Model" to conduct a decapitation strike against Iran is limited in the foreseeable future. A more likely choice is to maintain high-intensity deterrence, combined with limited precision strikes, supplemented by a comprehensive strategy to promote internal evolution within Iran.