Can "Collaborative Combat" Break the Deadlock? – A Comprehensive End-to-End Assessment of the U.S. Air Force Program

Key Chapter Title List

1. Abstract: Framework, Evidence, and Key Findings
2. Chapter 1: From Vision to Program: An Overview of Collaborative Combat Aircraft
3. Chapter 2: The End-to-End Process Cycle: A Universal Framework
4. Chapter 3: Assessment of the CCA Program
5. Chapter 4: Ten Unanswered Questions
6. Appendix A: Supporting Budget Data
7. List of Acronyms

Document Introduction

This report, published by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, provides a comprehensive and systematic end-to-end assessment of the U.S. Air Force's emerging Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. The CCA is viewed as a critical component of the next-generation air dominance architecture, designed to serve as a loyal wingman to manned fighter aircraft. It aims to execute missions such as forward sensing, air-to-air attack, and electronic warfare through autonomous collaboration, addressing numerical disadvantages at an affordable scale against China's Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) network in the Indo-Pacific region. The core of the report lies in evaluating the complete process of this program from concept to operational deployment.

To conduct this assessment, the report's author, Travis Sharp, developed an original analytical framework called the End-to-End Process Cycle. This framework consists of seven sequential steps: Define the Problem, Generate Resources, Develop Capability, Prepare the Organization, Deploy Capability, Employ Capability, and Adapt Practice. The framework synthesizes insights from multiple domains, including the Department of Defense's Capability Integration and Development System, military innovation theory, military force generation studies, and the kill chain model. It aims to provide a more comprehensive and integrated perspective than traditional program assessments, such as those by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office.

The assessment is based on six primary sources of evidence: publicly available information, briefings from Air Force officials, confidential interviews and exchanges with over 30 industry experts, a confidential survey of 38 experts from the Department of Defense, industry, and think tanks regarding affordable mass systems, a historical case study of the Vietnam War-era AQM-34 Firebee drone, and a supporting analytical report titled "Strategy Without Air Superiority," which examines CCA employment, deployment, and sortie generation in a Taiwan Strait scenario. The report uses a traffic light chart format to visually present progress ratings for the CCA program across the current seven steps.

The report's key findings indicate that the CCA program has made significant progress in defining the problem and generating resources. Key stakeholders generally agree on the problem of the Air Force's numerical disadvantage in manned aircraft, and the program has received strong initial budgetary support from Congress. However, progress has been relatively limited in steps such as developing capability, deploying capability, and employing capability. The report specifically notes that the Air Force's public discourse tends to emphasize the CCA's versatility across multiple missions. This emphasis blurs the necessary design and employment trade-offs required to optimize for specific tasks, such as persistent forward sensing in the Taiwan Strait or rapid return-to-target strikes, thereby hindering deeper planning for subsequent steps. Furthermore, significant challenges remain in areas such as organizational preparation (e.g., building trust in mission autonomy), deployment (e.g., basing selection and sustainment), and iterative adaptation based on operational experience.

Despite these challenges, the report's author remains optimistic, believing the CCA program can succeed by achieving discrete progress continuously. The report emphasizes that technological advancement alone is insufficient to ensure success; the program's ultimate outcome will equally depend on non-technical factors such as organizational integration, sustainment, basing choices, and coordination with allies. The CCA program carries symbolic significance for breaking the mold of the Department of Defense's traditional acquisition patterns, thus enjoying strong implicit political support. The report concludes by posing ten unanswered key questions concerning the CCA's relationship with manned aircraft, force structure, logistics, and historical lessons, providing direction for subsequent research and decision-making.