Missile and Air Defense Requirements: The UK's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System Construction Strategy

Key Chapter Title List

1. What is Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
2. Analysis of the Missile Threat Landscape
3. Missile Strike Potential of the Russian Northern Fleet
4. Threat Prioritization for the UK Homeland and Overseas Bases
5. Synergy Between Deterrence Mechanisms and Missile Defense
6. Construction Path for the UK's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System
7. Strategies for Enhancing Situational Awareness Capabilities
8. Plans for Strengthening Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Capabilities
9. Building Suppression/ Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (S/DEAD) Capabilities
10. Command and Control (C2) Network Integration
11. Optimization of Defense Coverage and Interceptor System Tiers
12. Missile Stockpile and Infrastructure Protection Measures

Document Introduction

With the advancement and proliferation of missile technology, the air and space threats facing the UK are becoming increasingly complex and diversified. In particular, the growing risk of missile strikes from the Russian Northern Fleet is prompting the UK to reassess the urgency of strengthening its air and missile defense capabilities. However, there remains a lack of clear consensus within the UK regarding the core requirements, capability priorities, and development pathways for its air and missile defense architecture. This strategic ambiguity has become a potential vulnerability for national security.

Using the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) framework as its core analytical lens, this report systematically examines the historical evolution, current challenges, and future requirements of UK air and missile defense based on a threat-oriented assessment methodology. The report first clarifies the core concept of IAMD, emphasizing its essential characteristic of achieving efficient synergy in Threat Evaluation and Weapon Assignment (TEWA) by integrating sensors, soft-kill measures, and hard-kill systems through a Command and Control (C2) network, distinguishing it from traditional, decentralized air and missile defense models.

In the threat assessment section, the report focuses on analyzing the composite threat posed by Russia's dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and conventional cruise missiles. It provides a detailed breakdown of the missile configurations of the Russian Northern Fleet's 26 submarines and 11 major surface combatants (totaling over 800 offensive missiles) and addresses the medium-to-long-term challenges arising from the development of missile capabilities in countries like Iran and China. Simultaneously, the report establishes a threat priority ranking for the UK's core domestic military infrastructure, overseas bases, and deployed forces.

The report delves into the capability gaps within the UK's current air and missile defense system, including insufficient situational awareness, atrophied anti-submarine warfare capabilities, a lack of enemy air defense suppression capabilities, inadequate missile stockpiles, and a fragmented command and control architecture. Based on this analysis, it proposes a strategic path combining offense and defense with precise investment: on one hand, suppressing enemy launch platforms by enhancing situational awareness in the Arctic region, upgrading anti-submarine warfare assets, and developing hypersonic anti-radiation weapons; on the other hand, constructing a layered interception system, optimizing the command and control network, expanding missile stockpiles, and strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure.

The report emphasizes that the UK's geographical characteristics dictate the uniqueness of its air and missile defense requirements, and it should not blindly replicate models from other nations. An effective Integrated Air and Missile Defense system must achieve organic synergy between strategic deterrence and defensive capabilities, maximizing strategic advantages while controlling defense budget costs, thereby contributing core capabilities to the security of the UK homeland, the protection of its overseas interests, and NATO's collective defense.